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New Legislative Agendas, Legal Professionals and Dispute
Resolution in Australia and Japan: 2009-2010
Luke NOTTAGE#
Abstract: This paper is the third in a series of edited and updated selections of my postings 
to the ‘East Asia Forum’ blog (indicated with a double asterisk in the Table of Contents 
below) and my partly-overlapping ‘Japanese Law and the Asia-Pacific’ blog. They mainly 
cover developments from mid-2009 through to mid-2010, with a focus on law and policy in 
Australia and Japan in a wider regional and sometimes global context. 
Half of the postings introduce some new policy and legislative agendas proclaimed 
by the then Prime Ministers of Australia (Kevin Rudd, in late July 2009) and Japan (Yukio 
Hatoyama, through the Democratic Party of Japan [DPJ] which he led to a remarkable 
general election victory in late August 2009). Both had resigned by mid-2010, indicating 
some of the difficulties involved in implementing ambitious reforms in both countries. All 
the more so, perhaps, if innovative measures are to be added to both countries’ Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) in order to foster more sustainable socio-economic development in the 
aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). 
The remaining postings end by introducing Australia’s regime for international (and 
domestic) commercial arbitration enacted in mid-2010, centred on a United Nations Model 
Law — like Japan’s Arbitration Act of 2003. However it sets these enactments in broader 
context by focusing on legal professionals — lawyers, judges and specialists in Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR) — as well as aspects of the legal education systems in both 
countries. Those systems will need to gel better as well for both Australia and Japan to 
achieve the ‘cultural reform’ needed to generate sustainable critical mass in commercial (and 
investor-state) arbitration activity.
The order of postings has been changed somewhat in this paper to create more of a ‘chain 
novel’ narrative effect. However, as with the previous two papers, readers may still prefer to 
move around the topics in a different order. 
Keywords: Japanese law, Australian law, Asian law, comparative law, international trade and 
investment law, Australia-Japan bilateral relations, regional economic integration, arbitration, 
ADR, legal profession, consumer law
  ＃　Associate Professor, Sydney Law School (luke.nottage@sydney.edu.au); and Co-Director, Australian 
Network for Japanese Law (ANJeL, now at <http://sydney.edu.au/law/anjel/>). Thanks yet again to Wan 
Sang Lung for fine editorial and research assistance. New citations and cross-references, not found in 
the original blog postings, are indicated in footnotes by an asterisk (*).
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A. New Legislative Agendas
1.  The New DPJ Government in Japan: Implications for Law Reform
(originally published on 1 September 2009)
Mainstream Australian media provided distressingly meager coverage of Japan’s exciting 
general election for the more powerful lower House of Representatives on Sunday 30 August 
2009, which saw a remarkable about-face.1） The centrist Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
went from 115 to 308 seats, with allies SDP (the small leftover of the once-powerful Social 
Democratic Party) and the New Party Nippon taking another 7 and 3 seats respectively. 
Overall, these and other former Opposition parties took 340 seats, whereas the conservative 
ruling coalition suffered a massive defeat. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dropped to 
119 seats, from 300 before the election (and 296 in 2005, the previous election called by 
Junichiro Kozumi who then retired as Prime Minister). The Komeito dropped from 31 to 21 
seats, meaning that the former ruling coalition now only has 140 seats. In short, the tables 
1）　‘In Landslide, DPJ Wins over 300 Seats: LDP Crushed; Hatoyama Set to Take Power’ (31 August 
2009) The Japan Times Online <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090831x2.html> (accessed 25 
July 2010).
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had turned almost completely since 2005, in a country (in) famous for its aversion to abrupt 
changes in direction.＊
Newspaper coverage in English tends to suggest that this is the first time the LDP 
has really lost power since 1955. Commentators usually do mention its loss in 1993, but 
add that this was only for a year. This overlooks that the fact that the SDP led a coalition 
incorporating the LDP from 1994-6, which saw some significant political developments 
(for example, a major settlement of the long-running Minamata Disease litigation). More 
importantly, the year the LDP was completely out of power generated important legislation 
ranging from measures promoting transparency in administrative procedures through to strict 
liability for defective products. It also laid the groundwork for further substantive law reforms 
in similar areas, such as the Official Information Disclosure Act 2001 and the Consumer 
Contracts Act 2000 (compared in Part 5 below). 
Most importantly, the LDP’s fall from power in 1993 made them and the bureaucracy 
reassess their close relationship. LDP politicians realised that even once back in power, they 
might lose again. From that perspective, a political process more open to diverse stakeholders 
— including ‘opposition’ interests — became more attractive. As part of this ongoing rethink, 
from the late 1990s the ‘deliberative council’ system for law reform certainly became more 
transparent, and alternative law-making processes developed as well (for example, private 
Members’ Bills). 
The LDP, prompted also by the Komeito, also began incorporating many centrist policies 
into its own program — trying to steal the DPJ’s thunder. Such developments provide a 
partial explanation for the counter-intuitive situation of a conservative coalition pressing ahead 
with major judicial reforms from 2001. These covered not just for civil justice (which at least 
some business interests also wanted), but also criminal justice (including the new quasi-jury 
system, discussed in Part 2 below).
These shifts — accommodating concerns of a wider voter base, in a more porous 
process serving as a back-up plan in case the LDP lost power again — seemed to be working 
out quite well, especially as the Japanese economy finally returned to a growth path from 
2002-7. But then came the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and economic stagnation potentially 
far worse than during Japan’s ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s, because it was driven by the world-
wide collapse of all Japan’s major markets for both exports and investment (including even 
China). Those who had already suffered from major socio-economic reforms and Japan’s 
banking crisis in the late 1990s became increasingly concerned about the LDP’s capacity to 
address these even larger challenges. One such group comprised the burgeoning numbers of 
‘involuntary non-regular workers’, young men and others who no longer had the option of 
one day joining the elite ‘lifelong employee’ cadre rather than deliberately choosing not to 
  ＊　In July 2010, however, LDP regained significant ground in elections for the upper House of Councilors. 
See ‘DPJ, Kan in Hot seat as Diet Open: Party Keeps Upper House Helm but LDP Flexes New Clout’ (30 
July 2010) <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100730x1.html> (accessed 11 August 2011).
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take up that life. (This group was highlighted in a public lecture on ‘flexicurity’ presented at 
Sydney Law School by former University of Tokyo Dean of Law, Emeritus Professor Kazuo 
Sugeno.2）) Unsurprisingly, despite LDP-led law reform in 2007 aimed at part of this group, 
the DPJ was able to attract a much higher proportion of younger voters.
All this means that we may not witness now huge changes in both the style and 
substance of law reform in Japan. This will not (merely) be because the DPJ government 
is new and relatively inexperienced, or due to reactionary forces, but also because some 
significant changes were already afoot. It is interesting, for example, to compare the 
pre-election manifestos of the LDP and the DPJ (themselves one indication of broader 
transformations in Japanese politics over the last decade) and other policy statements. On 
the other hand, it is certainly worth examining the DJP’s manifesto ‘promises’ to get a better 
idea of the new government’s likely legislative program for the next few years:
The DPJ’s policy summary (not necessarily identical to their manifesto distributed during 
the election compaign3）) is still currently only available in Japanese.4） But it states policies 
from areas such as:
• Cabinet (for example, regarding the Ainu, now recognised as an indigenous people);
• Children and women (for example, work-life balance, or allowing married couples to 
retain separate surnames);
• Consumers (for example, strengthening local government Consumer Lifestyle Centres, 
dealing with huge volumes of complaints and requests for information);
• Administrative reform (for example, limits of ‘amakudari [descent from heaven]’, that 
is, retiring from government into private sector jobs, increasingly commonplace also in 
the US and Australia!);
• Local-central government relations (for example, greater devolution and citizen 
involvement in governance);
• Political reform (for example, reducing lower house numbers and limiting ‘political 
dynasties’);
• Legal affairs (rethinking the new ‘Law School’ and legal examination system 
introduced from 2004, criminal justice improvements such as videotaping interrogations 
and possibly life sentences instead of the death penalty, a second round of administrative 
litigation reforms, possible multiple nationality even after minority at least for children 
of international marriages);
• Foreign affairs and security (especially strengthening relations with Asia);
2）　‘Distinguished Speakers Program 2009: Professor Kazuo Sugeno’ Sydney Law School <http://www.
usyd.edu.au/news/law/457.html?eventcategoryid=41&eventid=4126> (accessed 25 July 2010). See also 
Leon Wolff ‘The Death of Lifelong Employment in Japan?’ in Luke Nottage et al (eds) Corporate 
Governance in the 21st Century: Japan’s Gradual Transformation (Elgar, Cheltenham, 2008) 53.
3）　‘Manifesto’ <http://www.dpj.or.jp/special/manifesto2009/pdf/manifesto_2009.pdf> (accessed 25 July 2010).
4）　‘Minshuto Seisakushu Index 2009 [DPJ Policy Summary Index 2009]’ <http://www.dpj.or.jp/policy/
manifesto/seisaku2009> (accessed 25 July 2010).
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• Finance (including a new law on publically listed companies);
• Tax (including reviews of alcohol and beer taxes, and tax litigation processes);
• Health and welfare (for example, possible no-fault compensation schemes, and 
measures for hepatitis victims);
• Labour (for example, securing better conditions for non-regular workers, preventing 
and resolving disputes based on the Labour Contracts Act);
• Agriculture (for example, a traceability system for food products, and linked quarantine 
inspections);
• Construction and transport (for example, a Road Traffic Basic Law); 
• Environment (for example, measures to resolve some remaining Minamata and Kanemi 
Rice Bran mass claims, as well as ‘sick houses’ disputes and asbestos problems).
Later postings on the ‘Japanese Law and the Asia-Pacific’ blog – including several updated 
below for this paper – provide more detail, and report on how the new government did or 
did not follow up in these and other areas. But many of the topics just listed have already 
been introduced in previous postings on this blog,5） the East Asian Forum blog,6） or my other 
readily available work (for example, reproduced on the Social Science Research Network7）). 
2.  Japan’s New Quasi-Jury System and Video-Taping of Interrogations
(16 September 2009)
Japan has reintroduced a system involving lay participation in serious criminal trials. As 
discussed in several Australian Network for Japanese Law (ANJeL) events over recent years, 
this saiban’in system involves randomly selected ‘Lay Judges’ and professional career judges 
jointly assessing the facts to reach a verdict, as well as deciding on sentences.8） The model 
is more Continental European than Anglo-American, but a shared concern is to bring the 
justice system closer to citizens’ everyday life — a guiding principle in the Judicial Reform 
Council’s Final Recommendations issued in 2001. Diverse dimensions to greater popular 
participation throughout Japan’s legal process, including also my study of how the Japanese 
government organises its litigation services beyond the criminal justice sphere, will be the 
subject of ANJeL’s third book published through Edward Elgar.＊
5）　See, for example, ‘Japanese Law and the Asia-Pacific’ <http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/2009/08/
law_public_policy_and_economic.html> (accessed 25 July 2010).
6）　Available at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/author/lukenottage> (accessed 25 July 2010).
7）　Access via <http://www.ssrn.com/author=488525> (accessed 25 July 2010).
8）　See ANJeL, ‘Past Events’ <http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/anjel/content/anjel_events_past.html> (accessed 
26 July 2010).
  ＊　Leon Wolff, Luke Nottage and Kent Anderson (eds) Who Judges Japan? Popular Participation in the 
Japanese Legal Process (Elgar, Cheltenham, forthcoming in 2011). The first book was Luke Nottage, 
Leon Wolff and Kent Anderson (eds) Corporate Governance in the 21st Century: Japan’s Gradual 
Transformation (Elgar, Cheltenham, 2008) and the second was Takao Tanase (Luke Nottage and Leon ↗
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Legislation establishing this saiban’in system was enacted in 2004, but implementation 
was delayed for five years to allow all stakeholders to get used to the idea and the many 
practical implications. (For example, many of the ANJeL Judges-in-Residence sent to 
Australia by the Supreme Court of Japan have carefully compared how this country manages 
jury trials, especially in connection with the media.9）) The enactment illustrates my previous 
point that the former LDP-led coalition had already shifted away from more conservative 
stances even before its dramatic loss of power in the general election on 30 August this year. 
Even more ironically, although the first saiban’in trial took place without apparent mishap 
earlier that month, campaigns by the DPJ and other then-Opposition parties drew on growing 
concerns among the general public about actually having to serve as Lay Judges.10） Hopefully, 
however, Japan’s experience will become similar to Australia’s — where the general public 
is quite negative about serving on juries, but individual jurors afterwards report that it was a 
worthwhile experience. (A similar pattern is also observed in the US.11）)
Below I first reproduce translations of DPJ policy statements promising to make the 
new saiban’in system more user-friendly in various ways.12） Then I add its related policy 
statements about video-recording of interrogations of suspects undertaken by police or 
prosecutors in Japan.13） 
As explained in a paper by Professor Makoto Ibusuki, a frequent visitor to Australia 
and a Program Convenor — ANJeL in Japan,14） the new DPJ-led government seemed bound 
to enact legislation mandating full video-recording.15） Some politicians within the LDP 
anyway may have been open to this sort of reform too, but the pace should pick up. This 
particular law reform is bound to please the retiring Director of Public Prosecutions in New 
↘ Wolff trans and ed) Community and the Law: A Critical Reassessment of American Liberalism and 
Japanese Modernity (Elgar, Cheltenham, 2010). For the 2001 Final Report, see <http://www.kantei.go.jp/
foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html> (accessed 11 August 2010).
9）　See ANJeL, ‘ANJeL Visiting Professionals Scheme’ <http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/anjel/content/anjel_
people_judge.html> (accessed 26 July 2010).
10）　‘First Lay Judges Hand Killer 15-year term’ (7 August 2009) The Japan Times Online <http://search.
japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090807a1.html> (accessed 26 July 2010).
11）　Setsuko Kamiya, ‘Foreigners size up lay judge system’ (16 August 2009) The Japan Times Online 
<http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090816a6.html> (accessed 26 July 2010).
12）　Available at The Democratic Party of Japan, ‘Minshuto Seisakushu Index 2009 — Homu [DPJ Policy 
Summary Index 2009 — Legal Issues]’ <http://www.dpj.or.jp/policy/manifesto/seisaku2009/07.html> 
(accessed 26 July 2010).
13）　Both are slightly edited from translations kindly prepared by Glenn Kembrey, Sydney Law School 
student intern (<http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/anjel/content/anjel_people_dir.html>,accessed 26 July 2010) 
for the Centre for Asian and Pacific Law (CAPLUS, <http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/caplus>) who also 
assists with ANJeL activities.
14）　See ‘ANJeL Program Conveners’ <http://sydney.edu.au/law/anjel/content/anjel_people_prog.html> 
(accessed 26 July 2010).
15）　Makoto Ibusuki, ‘Who Keeps Watch over Incidents Behind Closed Doors? The Japanese Way of Video 
Recording in the Interrogation Room’ <http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/IbusukiVideoRecording_
LN03.pdf> (accessed 26 July 2010), p 6.
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South Wales (NSW), Mr Nicholas Cowdery QC, a key person behind the International Bar 
Association’s 2004 Report on ‘Interrogation of Criminal Suspects in Japan’ that recommended 
precisely this change.16）
(a) Smooth Implementation of the Lay Judge System
In May 2009, a Lay Judge system came into effect. While working towards 
increasing citizens’ understanding of the system by continuing to disseminate public 
information, making the process visible through audio and visual recording, and 
disclosure of the entirety of evidence held by the public prosecutor and so on, we will 
quickly introduce the necessary environment for having fair trials while preventing an 
increase in the length of lay-judge trials. 
In particular, the system will be quickly reviewed so as to decrease the burden on 
citizens who become lay judges. This will be achieved by adopting a flexible approach 
to those randomly selected citizens who present reasons for declining to serve as lay 
judges; by limits on the application of penal regulations for the breach of confidentiality 
obligations imposed on lay judges; by reviews of means for discussing the imposition of 
a death sentence; and by increasing the daily allowance paid to lay judges.
(b) Visualising Criminal Examinations, and Preventing False Charges through the 
Proper Disclosure of Evidence
Reforms will be carried out to achieve a fair and highly transparent criminal 
justice system, by aiming to achieve visualization through video recording of the entire 
examination process of a suspect by police, prosecutors and others. 
The need for this has recently has become clear through a succession of false 
accusations, such as the ‘Toyama Himi Incident’, ‘Shibushi Incident’ and ‘Ashikaga 
Incident’. However, this large problem is still dealt with in closed-off rooms. To 
prevent false accusations on the basis of coerced confessions in [suspect] examinations, 
we will (1) require investigating authorities to use audio and visual recording of the 
entire process of suspect examinations so as to be able to determine the voluntariness 
of confessions, if in dispute at trial; (2) implement an amendment to the Criminal 
Procedure Code requiring the creation and disclosure of a table listing evidence held by 
the prosecutors and so on, to obtain thorough disclosure of evidence at criminal trials.
16）　‘IBA Human Rights Institute Supports Calls for the Introduction of Electronic Recording in Japan’s 
Police Interviews’ <http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=bea2ec34-5513-4991-8192-
0e6ed5e70d9c> (accessed 26 July 2010). Renowned for resisting political and media pressure to bring 
prosecutions, he retired in April 2010: see ‘DPP Nick Cowdery Retires, But it Won't be Quietly’ (15 
April 2010) <http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/national/dpp-nick-cowdery-retires-but-it-wont-be-
quietly/story-e6freuzr-1225853816850> (accessed 11 August 2010).
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3.  ‘Pain on the Road to Recovery’ — So What, for Consumer (Credit) Law 
Reform for Australia (and Beyond)?
(28 July 2009)
The then Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd, contributed a long essay with this title 
to the Sydney Morning Herald on 25-6 July 2009.17） Here are some extracts that should be 
connected to ongoing initiatives and discussions about consumer credit and consumer law 
more generally:
(a) Rudd’s grand plan now for the forthcoming ‘building decade’:
It will take time to build the foundations of Australia’s long-term global 
competitiveness. But we must take time to do it thoroughly. We must take time to invest 
in the infrastructure of the future, the skills of the future, the competitive tax system we 
need for the future, an ambitious agenda for competition and regulatory reform, and to 
maintain the best national balance sheet of major advanced economies.
(b) On ‘causes of the current crisis’:
Similarly to the US, ‘Australian consumers also spent up big. Between 1996 and 
2007 there was a 460 per cent increase in credit card debt, a 340 per cent increase in 
household debt, a 450 per cent increase in corporate debt and a 200 per cent increase in 
net foreign debt.
(c) On ‘the ideological hypocrisy of the right’:
As I have argued elsewhere, the boom-and-bust economic cycle of the past 
decade has been an unavoidable consequence of a decade of neo-liberal free market 
fundamentalism that reinforced a culture of corporate greed and excess in the financial 
sector. The central principles of this extreme form of capitalism are that markets are 
self-regulating; that government should get out of the road of the market altogether 
and that the state itself should retreat to its core historical function of security at home 
and abroad. This fundamentalist ideology of self-regulating markets has imploded 
comprehensively with the current crisis. We have seen spectacular market failure 
requiring equally spectacular government intervention in the economy to effectively save 
the system from itself.
(d) As for ‘new challenges of recovery’:
This crisis has shown we have reached the limits of a purely debt-fuelled global 
growth strategy. Not only will the neo-liberal model of the past not provide growth for 
the future, its after-effects will make recovery more difficult. Mountains of global public 
17）　See < http://www.smh.com.au/national/pain-on-the-road-to-recovery-20090724-dw6q.html>. In June 
2010, however, Rudd was deposed by his Deputy Prime Minister, Julia Gillard: see <http://www.smh.
com.au/national/gillard--becomes-australias-first-female-prime-minister-as-tearful-rudd-stands-aside-
20100624-yzvw.html> (both accessed 11 August 2010).
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and private debt, global imbalances, and a weakened global financial system will drag 
on global growth for a long time.
(e) Out of ‘five key areas to boost productivity’ and hence Australia’s new 
global competitiveness, First, regulatory and competition reform’ (plus Infrastructure, 
Innovation, Skills and Tax — then a broader reform agenda including savings 
and retirement income):... Competitive markets encourage business innovation and 
productivity. Sound regulation can bring many benefits to consumers and businesses 
by promoting employee welfare, consumer safety, fair competition and protecting 
property rights. Poor regulation, however, can damage wealth creation, stifle business 
innovation and hamper our ability to deliver core public services. Efficient regulation 
strikes a balance that encourages competition but protects employees, consumers, small 
businesses and macro-economic stability. That is why the Government has launched a 
comprehensive regulatory reform agenda under the Council of Australian Governments.
To my mind, it is heartening18） that Rudd has not recanted from his critique of 
market fundamentalism in policy formation and implementation, 19） despite the considerable 
controversy it engendered.20） But ‘consumer safety’ gets only a bare mention from Rudd. 
And that comes in the context of the Council of Australian Government’s (CoAG’s) broader 
regulatory reform agenda (BRCWG). That agenda in fact looks rather like business as usual 
— ‘the reduction of the regulatory burden on businesses by accelerating and broadening 
the regulation reduction work program, and improving processes for regulation making and 
review’.21） Especially since this BRCWG process also now includes a more conservative 
government in New Zealand.22）
Rudd’s essay also does not mention unfair consumer contract terms legislation, perhaps 
because the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill was tabled already 
in late June.23） But we know from the Victorian state legislation from 2002 and the 1993 
18）　Luke Nottage, ‘Neoclassical and Chicago School Economics Keeps Coming to Japan(ese Law)’ 
(6 June 2009) <http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/2009/06/neoclassical_and_chicago_schoo.html> 
(accessed 26 July 2010).
19）　Kevin Rudd, ‘The Global Financial Crisis’ The Monthly Magazine <http://www.themonthly.com.au/
node/1421> (accessed 26 July 2010).
20）　For various more thoughtful responses, see the May 2009 issue of The Monthly, eg Robert Manne, 
‘The Rudd Essay & the Global Financial Crisis’ <http://www.themonthly.com.au/The-Rudd-Essay-and-
the-Global-Financial-Crisis-Robert-Manne> (accessed 26 July 2010).
21）　Minister for Finance and Deregulation, ‘COAG Working Group kicks off Regulatory Reform Agenda 
for 2009’ Media Release (13 March 2009) <http://www.financeminister.gov.au/media/2009/mr_142009_
joint.html> (accessed 26 July 2010).
22）　Simon Power, ‘NZ Joins Australian Regulatory Reform Group’ (18 June 2009) <http://www.beehive.
govt.nz/release/nz+joins+australian+regulatory+reform+group> (accessed 26 July 2010).
23）　Gadens Lawyers, ‘Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill 2009 — amends 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 and Australian and Investments Act 2001’ (July 2009) <http://www.
gadens.com.au/Publications-View.aspx?documentid=1487> (accessed 26 July 2010). For subsequent ↗
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European Directive that the success of such legislation is very dependent on commitment by 
regulators (and therefore their political masters and mistresses) to follow-up with publicity, 
guidance and enforcement activity. Even more surprisingly, Rudd doesn’t mention the broader 
‘Australian Consumer Law’ project led now by the Treasury, nor its National Consumer 
Credit Law proposal. The latter includes new ‘suitability rules’ for lenders that should 
significantly restrict their ability to take advantage of increasingly obvious psychological 
biases and heuristics that have underpinned the burgeoning consumer over-indebtedness 
highlighted again by Rudd in this essay.
Do such omissions mean that these reform initiatives already have so much backing 
from the Prime Minister and his Cabinet (including a new Consumer Affairs Minister) 
that the reforms are expected to be implemented without any problems? Or instead do the 
omissions indicate consumer law’s low priority for this Government, as well as Howard’s 
over 1996-2007, despite Rudd’s renewed call now for a more level playing field in policy-
making overall? We should be able to judge this better by the general election called for 
August 2010, by which time when the entire Consumer Law and consumer credit packages 
were to have been enacted. The answer has important repercussions not only for Australian 
consumers, businesses, and governments. It also matters to those close trading partners 
already increasingly integrated in regulatory harmonisation extending beyond the scope of 
classic WTO/FTA agreements (such as New Zealand) or potentially so (such as Japan24）).
4.  Lessons for Australia – How (Japan and) Other Countries Are Dealing with 
Current Consumer Issues
(2 September 2009)
Tezukayama University Professor Michelle Tan spoke with me on this topic at the big 
SOCAP (Society of Consumer Affairs Professionals) conference in Sydney over 25-26 
August.25） Key conference themes were the impact of the GFC and world-wide recession, 
and the new nation-wide Australian Consumer Law reforms.26） We emphasised the need for 
Australia to unify consumer nation-wide by ‘trading up’ not only to best practice from among 
its states and territories, but also to emerging global standards. Our presentation compared 
developments in consumer policy/administration generally, product liability and safety, 
consumer credit and unfair contract terms, collective redress and consumer ADR. (Powerpoints 
and a related Working Paper are online, drawing on my various Submissions to aspects of 
↘ developments see also ‘ACReN: Australian Consumer Research Network’ <http://acren.wordpress.com/> 
and Parts 5 and 6 below.
24）　See Luke Nottage, ‘Taking the Australia-Japan FTA negotiations to new levels’ (3 July 2008) <http://
www.eastasiaforum.org/2008/07/03/taking-the-australia-japan-fta-negotiations-to-new-levels/> (accessed 
26 July 2010) and Part 7 below.
25）　‘SOCAP Australia’ <http://www.socap.org.au/> (accessed 26 July 2010).
26）　See also Part 3.
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Australia’s current consumer law reform program.27）) 
I suggested that Japan’s experience shows how consumers have benefitted by firms 
generally provided excellent customer service, but that the burst of its own ‘bubble’ economy 
and consequent ‘lost decade’ of economic stagnation over the 1990s led to some (even large 
firms) cutting too many corners. Across most firms, however, the slowdown probably led to 
even greater attention to consumer service — unlike Australia at least until the GFC, where 
firms paid less attention when the economy was booming. And in Japan, those instances of 
corner-cutting generated growing momentum in consumer law reform, as more generally in 
the European Union. Belatedly, we may be seeing a similar phenomenon unfolding now in 
Australia. 
Japan’s experience is also instructive for another major reason. Significant consumer 
law re-regulation has occurred even amidst broader economic liberalisation — or perhaps 
precisely because of it. Indeed, it has occurred despite the government’s judicial system 
reform initiatives designed to reduce ex ante regulation overall, in favour of greater market 
forces plus ex post compensation via private law claims — a model exemplified by the US, 
but also quite influential in Australia.28）
Michelle Tan also presented the following general overview about developments in 
Japan – reproduced here with kind permission – which help explain some emphasis given to 
consumer issues in the election manifesto of the Democratic Party of Japan.29） It still remains 
to be seen how (quickly) some of those DPJ initiatives will be introduced, but already Japan’s 
new Consumer Affairs Agency has commenced operations pursuant to legislation enacted 
under the former LDP-led coalition government.30） Indeed, the DPJ was unhappy with former 
27）　Luke Nottage, ‘Consumer Law Reform in Australia: Contemporary and Comparative Constructive 
Criticism’ (August 2009) <http://sydney.edu.au/law/scil/documents/2009/SCILWP24_Nottage.pdf>, further 
updated in special issue 9(2) QUT Law and Justice Journal (2009) available via <http://www.law.qut.
edu.au/ljj/editions/v9n2/index.jsp> (both accessed 26 July 2010).
28）　Luke Nottage, ‘Who Defends Japan? Government Lawyers and Judicial System Reform in Japan and 
Australia’ (13 July 2009) <http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/2009/07/who_defends_japan_government_
l.html> (accessed 26 July 2010).
29）　See Part 1. Professor Tan comes from Brisbane and has lived in Japan for more than 20 years. She 
lives in Kobe and teaches at Tezukayama University in Nara. Michelle studied law at Queensland 
University before leaving for Japan where she obtained a PhD in Economic Law from Osaka University. 
Michelle has been teaching consumer protection policy and law at Tezukayama University since 1997. 
With Luke Nottage she co-teaches a ‘Consumers and Law’ module in the Kyoto Seminar course in 
Japanese Law accredited for Sydney Law School and taught intensively each February at Ritsumeikan 
Law School in collaboration with the Australian Network for Japanese Law (<http://www.kyoto-
seminar.jp/> , accessed 26 July 2010). In recent years her research has focused on the role of soft 
law mechanisms such as internal/ external complaints handling, codes of conduct and standards in 
strengthening compliance and promoting consumer protection. Michelle has advised many governmental 
bodies, companies and consumers associations on consumer issues.
30）　‘Consumer Agency Opens Sept 1’ (12 August 2009) The Japan Times Online <http://search.japantimes.
co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090812b2.html> (accessed 26 July 2010).
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Prime Minister Aso’s selection of a former Cabinet Office top official to head the Agency31） - 
although the new government ended up keeping him on.
＊＊＊
The Japanese Fundamental Act on Consumers, which dates back to 1968,＊ is an 
extremely important law that sets out the basic principles and framework of consumer 
protection in Japan — the ‘Constitution’ in the area of consumer protection. This 
framework sets out the roles of national and local government (as well as business and 
consumers) with respect to consumer protection. But even despite a major revision of the 
act about 5 years ago, until last year there had never been a serious attempt to establish 
a single administrative agency with primary responsibility for consumer affairs.
So the introduction of a Consumer Affairs Agency, overseen by the Cabinet Office, 
represents a complete upheaval of the current system. The Consumer Agency commenced 
operations on 1 September this year, somewhat earlier than the original plan for a October-
November start. (This was a sudden decision, no doubt a result of pre-election jitters 
within the LDP and, more importantly, the bureaucracy — who wouldn’t have wanted the 
inauguration date set back at this late stage.) The new agency has jurisdiction over laws 
covering most areas such as consumer transactions, food and product safety as well as 
having authority to regulate in areas where legislative gaps exist (for example, konnyaku 
jelly32）). In addition, a new central product injury surveillance system is in the planning.
What is the background to such recent reforms in Japan? Japanese consumers 
have very high expectations of their companies. Companies are expected to deliver an 
extremely high level of customer service. And they are punished severely by consumers, 
and more recently, even by the law, if they don’t deliver. Despite an extraordinarily 
high level of customer service, in recent years there have been a range of issues arising, 
notably involving food products (particularly sensitive) and product related injuries 
and deaths, and the current legal system just hasn’t been able to provide an adequate 
response.
2000 was the year that started off a seemingly never-ending string of scandals in 
the food and product safety area, involving very famous Japanese companies. I think 
it was the food scandals which particularly angered the Japanese, for two reasons. 
Firstly, because we all have to eat, and therefore are all potential victims of any one 
31）　See <http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=200908/2009083101437&rel=j&g=soc> (accessed 2 September 
2009).
  ＊　The Act is available via ‘Japanese Law Translation’ <http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/> 
(accessed 26 July 2010).
32）　Luke Nottage, ‘A New Consumer Agency for Japan? Consumer Redress, Contracts and Product 
Safety’ (30 October 2008) <http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/2008/10/a_new_consumer_agency_for_
japa.html> (accessed 26 July 2010).
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of the frequently occurring scandals. Secondly, the companies did what they did purely 
for profit-making reasons, which the Japanese see as is a complete betrayal of their 
obligations to society. 
As a result of these scandals, which couldn’t be prevented and couldn’t be 
adequately dealt with afterwards, Japanese consumers have been feeling very ‘insecure’ 
and distrustful of companies. This is not a good way to feel in general, and in the 
Japanese context it tends to cause people to react very negatively or cynically to 
company’s behaviour — be it good behaviour or otherwise. 
One important effect of this general lack of trust in companies has been an 
enormous increase in the number of complaints that Japanese companies receive, and 
also an increase in the number of difficult complaints they receive. Especially since 
2000, when there was a huge scandal involving out-of-date milk being taken back to 
the manufacturer (Snow Brand) and resterilised for re-sale. Unfortunately, the milk got 
contaminated in the process and about 10,000 people who drank Snow Brand milk got 
food poisoning.
One important role for the new Consumer Agency will be to ensure compliance 
with the law to restore consumer trust in companies and thus ensure the ‘safety’ and 
‘security’ of Japanese consumers (Expressed as a single indivisible concept, ‘Anzen, 
Anshin’ in Japanese. This expression is used frequently these days by all stakeholders.)
The Fundamental Act on Consumers, as amended a few years ago, now states that 
companies have a duty to respond to complaints in an appropriate and timely fashion. And 
this means that complaints handling and what’s called the ‘voice of the consumer’ are 
considered, at the policy level, to be extremely important. Self-regulatory or soft law tools 
such as standards and codes of conduct are becoming increasingly important for Japanese 
companies as a way of ensuring that companies do respond to the consumer voice.
5.  Unfair Consumer Contracts Law Reform in Australia (at last), Japan and Europe
(11 August 2009)
Compared to Australian and New Zealand legislation, Japan’s Consumer Contracts Act 
2000 has quite narrow restrictions on the bargaining process leading up to the conclusion 
of contracts between consumers and commercial suppliers.33） But it adds a ‘general clause’ 
regulating unfair contract terms, voiding those that ‘impair the interests of consumers 
unilaterally against the fundamental principle’ of good faith under Civil Code Art 1(2), as 
well as targeting some specific types of terms.34） The Consumer Contracts Act also extends to 
33）　The Act is available via ‘Japanese Law Translation’ <http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/> 
(accessed 26 July 2010). See also Luke Nottage, ‘Nihon-Nyujirando Shohishakeiyakuho [Consumer 
Contract Law in Japan and New Zealand]’ (June 2000) 1620 Toki no Horei 4-5.
34）　Luke Nottage, ‘Form and Substance in US, English, New Zealand and Japanese Law: A ↗
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all types of contracts (except employment contracts: Art 48), and defines ‘consumer’ broadly 
as any individual not contracting for a business purpose (Art 2). 
This definition is similar to that of the 1993 EC Directive on unfair terms (93/13/
EEC),35） which provided a major impetus to enactment in Japan (as did the 1985 Directive 
for Japan’s Product Liability Act 1994). However, Art 4(2) of the 1993 Directive excludes 
terms relating to ‘the definition of the main subject matter of the contract’ or ‘the adequacy 
of the price and remuneration … in so far as these terms are in plain intelligible language’, 
with the Preamble specifically mentioning insurance contract premiums. The annexed 
indicative ‘grey list’ of clauses that may prove unfair also suggests that certain terms found 
in financial services contracts are likely to be acceptable. Article 3(1) voids ‘any contractual 
term which has not been individually negotiated … as unfair if, contrary to the requirement 
of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising 
under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer’. 
Article 7 adds an important obligation on European member states to provide ‘adequate 
and effective means’ to prevent usage of unfair terms, including injunctions. Consumers were 
unable to obtain such provisions in Japan’s original Act, but they were added in 2006 and are 
already having some impact.36） By contrast, the EU was slower than Japan in harmonising 
controls focusing solely on the contract negotiation process. These came only in the 2005 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EC). But that now includes quite general 
clauses prohibiting misleading conduct vis-à-vis consumers (Arts 6 and 7).
What about Australia? The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) or ‘TPA’ included a very 
broad prohibition on misleading and deceptive conduct in trade (s 52), which competitor 
firms as well as individual consumers and regulators could invoke. Part V Div 2 also 
voids attempts by corporations to limit specific statutory warranties (merchantable quality, 
fitness for purpose notified before supply, and so on) when supplying goods and services to 
‘consumers’ as defined (for example, for goods) in s 4B(1):37）
(a) a person shall be taken to have acquired particular goods as a consumer if, and only if: 
(i) the price of the goods did not exceed [$40,000]; or 
(ii) where that price exceeded [$40,000] the goods were of a kind ordinarily 
acquired for personal, domestic or household use or consumption or the goods consisted 
of a commercial road vehicle; 
↘ Framework for Better Comparisons of Developments in the Law of Unfair Contracts’ (1996) 26 
Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 247, also available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=842684> (accessed 26 July 2010).
35）　‘Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’ <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31993L0013:EN:NOT> (accessed 26 July 2010).
36）　Nottage, above n 32.
37）　Available via ‘Austlii’ <http://www.austlii.edu.au> (accessed 26 July 2010), along with the legislation 
as amended in 2010 to take effect from 2011.
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and the person did not acquire the goods, or hold himself or herself out as acquiring the 
goods, for the purpose of re supply or for the purpose of using them up or transforming 
them, in trade or commerce, in the course of a process of production or manufacture or 
of repairing or treating other goods or fixtures on land.
In addition, for transactions under $40,000 suppliers can limit (but not exclude totally) 
liability if this is ‘fair and reasonable’ and the goods are not ordinarily for personal use (s68A). 
Further, the obligation to take due care when providing services (s 74(1)) always excludes 
‘(a) a contract for or in relation to the transportation or storage of goods for the purposes 
of a business, trade, profession or occupation carried on or engaged in by the person for 
whom the goods are transported or stored; or (b) a contract of insurance’ (s 74(3)). And the 
fitness for purpose obligation is excluded for ‘services of a professional nature provided by a 
qualified architect or engineer’ (s 74(2)).
The scope of application for these consumer protection provisions is therefore very 
convoluted and seemingly quite arbitrary, partly reflecting the lobbying power of certain 
professional groups in obtaining exclusions from TPA obligations. And the mandatory 
statutory warranties have been displaced in practice by retailers increasingly selling ‘extended 
warranties’, even though the mandatory warranties often would or should provide similar 
coverage anyway. Retailers and consumers also tend now to believe that the only really 
important thing is express warranties provided by manufacturers, even though the latter 
also owe statutory warranties similar to those of retailers (see Part V Div 2A, added in 
1986). This confusion is not helped by the fact that there is no statutory requirement that 
such express voluntary warranties be in plain intelligible language, as under the 1999 EC 
Consumer Guarantees Directive (1999/44/EC). Such problems are highlighted in a Review 
of Statutory Implied Terms and Warranties initiated in late July 2009 by the Commonwealth 
Consumer Affairs Advisory Council.38） This is another part of the Australian government’s 
review of consumer law and policy overall since February 2009, following a detailed Report 
of the Productivity Commission released in April 2008.39） 
Australia’s legislation was likely to become even more complicated as a result of the 
federal Parliament introducting the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) 
Bill on 26 June 2009.40） This laudably added a long-overdue missing link in Australia’s 
38）　Australian Government — The Treasury, ‘CCAAC Review of Statutory Implied Conditions and 
Warranties’ <http://www.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.asp?ContentID=1521&NavID=037> (accessed 26 
July 2010).
39）　Australian Government — The Treasury, ‘An Australian Consumer Law: Fair Markets 
— Confident Consumers — Consultation Paper’ <http://www.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.
asp?NavId=&ContentID=1484> (accessed 26 July 2010).
40）　Parliament of Australia: Senate, ‘Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill 2009’ 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/economics_ctte/tpa_consumer_law_09/index.htm> (accessed 26 
July 2010). The final version of the Bill, as enacted, is also available via the Parliament’s website or in 
the Trade Practices Act as amended available via http://www.austlii.edu.au.
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consumer protection regime: broader restrictions on all unfair terms. These followed the 
lead of amendments to Victoria’s Fair Trading Act in 2002, in turn based on the 1993 
EC Directive. The Bill likewise applied to a ‘consumer contract’ defined as supply ‘to 
an individual whose acquisition …. is wholly or predominantly for personal, domestic or 
household use or consumption’ (that is, a non-business purpose). This is a partial throwback 
to a more subjective test than in the TPA prior to the recent amendments. But the latter’s 
original definition (in 1974, before an amendment in 1977 generating s 4B above) had asked 
whether goods or services were ordinarily used for ‘private use’. Even under the s 4B(4) 
of the TPA, ‘commercial road vehicle’ is defined more subjectively to the user: ‘vehicle or 
trailer acquired for use principally in the transport of goods on public roads’. The Contracts 
Review Act 1980 (NSW) also does not provide for relief from an ‘unjust’ contract ‘in so 
far as the contract was entered into in the course of or for the purpose of a trade, business 
or profession carried on by the person or proposed to be carried on by the person, other 
than a farming undertaking’ (s 6). Australian courts and others interpreting the Bill’s unfair 
terms provisions may also be able to draw on similar wording delimiting the applicability 
of consumer credit legislation (itself under review since 2009).41） The Bill’s definition of 
‘consumer’ also had the potential to displace at least some definitions within the original 
TPA, such as Part V Div 2; but a second Amendment Bill ended up not taking that route, 
instead largely retaining the old definitions.＊
In addition, the Bill included financial services but specifically excludes charterparties 
and contracts for marine salvage, towage, carriage of goods by sea, and the constitution of 
a company, managed investment scheme or other kind of body. It also excluded a consumer 
contract term that ‘defines the main subject matter of the contract, or sets the upfront price 
payable’. So this is likely to exclude insurance contract premiums, as under the 1993 EC 
Directive. The Bill was also similar in applying only to standard-form contract terms. This 
restriction reflects a strong outcry from business interests when the Treasury released a 
Consultation Paper in May 2009 containing an Exposure Draft providing for coverage not 
limited to standard form contracts (as still in Japan, following an older German law approach). 
Thus, like the 1993 Directive, the Bill reflected partly still a ‘procedural justice’ 
model of consumer law, focused on transparency and the need to safeguard some consent, 
particularly with standard-form contracts. But also the Bill also partly suggested a 
‘commutative justice’ model, focused on substantive balance or fairness.42） 
41）　Luke Nottage, ‘Responsible Consumer Lending Rules for Australia Too: Submission on the National 
Consumer Credit Protection Bill’ (11 May 2009) <http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/2009/05/
responsible_consumer_lending_r.html> (accessed 26 July 2010).
  ＊　See Luke Nottage ‘Second TPA Amendment Act Passed – But Applies to Different “Consumers” 
than First Act’ (1 July 2010) <http://acren.wordpress.com/2010/07/01/second-tpa-amendment-act-passed-
%E2%80%93-but-applies-to-different-consumers-than-first-act/> (accessed 11 August 2010).
42）　Thomas Wilhelmsson and Chris Willett ‘Unfair Terms and Standard Form Contracts’ in Geraint 
Howells, Iain Ramsay and Thomas Wilhelmsson (eds) Handbook of Research on International ↗
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The biggest difference with the Directive, and Japan’s Consumer Contract Act, lay in 
the Bill’s definition of an ‘unfair’ term — if ‘(a) it would cause a significant imbalance in 
the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract; and (b) it is not reasonably 
necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the party who would otherwise be advantaged 
by the term’. The Victorian Act likewise has been amended this year to remove any reference 
to ‘good faith’. This follows a 2005 report of the English and Scottish Law Commissions, 
and also is related to current confusion in Australian (commercial) contract law about the 
content (and applicability) of a generalised duty of good faith.43） Yet TPA provisions on 
broader ‘unconscionable conduct’ still list good faith as a factor (Part IV.A). And its excision 
from the Bill means that Australia will miss out on an opportunity to learn from how civil 
law tradition countries in Europe and Japan have developed this principle to balance the 
various social interests involved when providing the (scarce) resources of the state to enforce 
contracts, especially now those involving consumers.
However, the Bill did give more bite back to enforcement proceedings. Where a term is 
declared unfair by a court, or proscribed by the Minister (by Regulation — but none were 
proposed along with the Bill), the regulator (especially the ACCC) can bring injunction 
proceedings that also seek further orders against corporations using such terms, in favour of 
those not party to the original proceedings. These orders can include refunds for them, for 
example, but not full damages. This is a welcome amendment to the narrow scope of TPA s 
87 (limiting orders to parties alone), as interpreted in Medibank Private v Cassidy.44） But the 
ACCC had been pushing for this reform for the last seven years, pointing out for example 
that the securities regulator (ASIC) has long had such broader powers. 
So that particular reform of the TPA’s enforcement regime confirms my impression 
about Australia’s ‘lethargic’ attitude to consumer law reform since the 1990s.45） So does the 
fact that the unfair terms rules only come into effect at the federal level from 1 July 2010, 
and are applied by most states in their own legislation only from 1 January 2011. Part of the 
backdrop is Australia’s complex constitutional system, but this timeframe also reflects a lack 
of political will – compared for example to Europe nowadays, and arguably also Japan. 
To keep up momentum and make sure Australia maintains global standards, it will 
be important to fund better comparative and empirical research centred around consumer 
law specialists in Australian universities. To that end, Sydney Law School hosted the 4th 
↘ Consumer Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), Chapter 7.
43）　Elisabeth Peden, ‘When Common Law Trumps Equity: The Rise of Good Faith and Reasonableness 
and the Demise of Unconscionability’ Sydney Law School Research Paper No 06/57 <http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=947361> (accessed 26 July 2010).
44）　[2002] FCAFC 290.
45）　Luke Nottage, ‘Australia’s Lethargic Law Reform: How (Not) to Revive Consumer Spending’ (25 
March 2009) <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/03/25/australias-lethargic-law-reform-how-not-to-revive-
consumer-spending/> (accessed 26 July 2010).
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Consumer Law Roundtable on 4 December 2009.46） And in another Treasury consultation 
recently about consumer policy research and advocacy, Roundtable members have also 
proposed the establishment of the ‘Australian Consumer Research Network’ (ACReN), partly 
inspired by the flexible cross-institutional Australian Network for Japanese Law.47）
6.  Comparing Product Safety Re-Regulation in Australia: The Never-Ending Story
(2 December 2009)
Product Safety is one major theme for the 4th Consumer Law Roundtable, hosted this 
year at Sydney Law School on 4 December 2009.48） Others include unfair contract terms 
and consumer credit, and this Roundtable had an Asia-Pacific focus. Professor Michelle Tan 
joined us again from Japan, and keynote speakers were Professor Tsuneo Matsumoto (chair 
of Japan’s new Consumer Commission49）) and Victoria University of Wellington’s Kate 
Tokeley (considering unfair contract terms from a New Zealand perspective).50） A major role 
of the new Consumer Affairs Agency — supervised by a Commission — is to collect and 
analyse consumer product-related accident data, which Japanese suppliers need to disclose 
since amendments in 2006.
Meanwhile, on 16 November 2009 the Australian Treasury initiated yet another public 
Consultation: ‘Regulatory Impact Statement — Australian Consumer Law — Best Practice 
Proposals and Product Safety Regime’.51） Before being considered for a Bill, a cost-
benefit analysis (RIS) has been required for these proposals, based on consumer law reform 
recommendations from the Productivity Commission (PC) in 2008 other than those (especially 
unfair contract terms regulations) which were introduced as a separate Bill in July — without 
the extra hurdle of such a RIS analysis. Unfortunately, the Treasury did not publicise well this 
latest Consultation and required Submissions by 30 November.52） They wanted to report to the 
Ministerial Council of Consumer Affairs (MCCA), also scheduled for 4 December — alongside, 
46）　Sydney Law School, ‘Seminars and Events’ <http://sydney.edu.au/law/caplus/events.shtml> (accessed 
26 July 2010).
47）　Australian Government — The Treasury, ‘Consumer Voices: Sustaining Advocacy and Research 
in Australia’s New Consumer Policy Framework’ <http://www.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.
asp?NavId=014&ContentID=1532> (accessed 26 July 2010).
48）　Sydney Law School, above n 46. 
49）　Professor Matsumoto’s outline may be found at ‘New Administrative Framework for Consumer 
Protection in Japan: Consumer Affairs Agency and Consumer Commission’ <http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/
japaneselaw/RoundtableMatsumoto.pdf> (accessed 26 July 2010).
50）　See also Part 4.
51）　Australian Government — The Treasury, ‘Consultation Regulation Impact Statement — Australian 
Consumer Law — Best Practice Proposals and Product Safety Regime’ <http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/
japaneselaw/2009/12/comparing_product_safety_rereg.html> (accessed 26 July 2010).
52）　For example, not via their portal at <http://www.treasury.gov.au/consumerlaw/> (accessed 5 August 
2010).
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incidentally, Prime Minister Rudd’s major conference on his Asia Pacific Community concept.53）
Despite this very tight deadline, I provided the following Submission in response 
to Part II of the Consultation Paper (pp 82-98), regarding product safety re-regulation. I 
elaborated mainly on a few key points developed in my Submission to the first consultation 
on the Australian Consumer Law reform announced in February 2009.54） The hope was that 
Australia would finally join Japan and many other Asia-Pacific countries (China, Canada and 
the US) in adopting the new global standards for product safety.
PC Report’s Recommendation 9.3: reporting requirement for products associated 
with serious injury
1. The PC’s report in 2008 appears to offer an alternative requirement of only 
requiring reporting if there had been a successful product liability claim or out-of-court 
settlements. But that aimed to reiterate the PC’s recommendations from its report of 
2006 specifically on product safety, and the latter report in fact preferred the stronger 
option of disclosure for any products associated with serious injury. This should be the 
minimum new standard for the PC’s reasons which you summarise at the bottom of 
page 92 of your Paper.
2. Since 2006 all Australia’s major trading partners (including China since 2007) have at 
least this disclosure requirement, extending to their importers as well as manufacturers. 
But they go further to require notification of certain risks associated with consumer 
goods, not just actual injury or death as proposed for Australia. The US has had this 
requirement from the 70s, with further provisions added in 1990 (situations creating ‘an 
unreasonable risk of serious injury or death’). The revised European Directive of 2001 
also requires disclosure of serious risks. Japan’s amendments in 2006 require disclosure 
of risks specified in regulations – currently situations involving (officially notified) fires, 
even if no injury results. Legislation introduced in Canada recently covers ‘an occurrence 
in Canada or elsewhere that resulted or may reasonably have been expected to result in 
an individual’s death or in serious adverse effects on their health, including a serious 
injury’. In light of these developments world-wide, MCCA should revisit the PC’s 
recommendation and take it a step forward. Its arguments for a disclosure obligation 
effectively apply also to the new global standard that extends disclosure to at least 
some serious risks, not just actual injuries that may have been fortuitously avoided in a 
53）　See my revised blog ‘Asia Pacific Socio-economic Regional Architecture: Beyond FTAs and ‘Business 
As Usual’ (1 December 2009) <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/12/01/asia-pacific-socio-economic-
regional-architecture/> (accessed 26 July 2010).
54）　Submissions are available at Australian Government — The Treasury, ‘Submissions: An Australian 
Consumer Law: Fair Markets – Confident Consumers’ <http://www.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.
asp?ContentID=1501&NavID=> (accessed 26 July 2010).
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particular case.
3. In assessing costs versus benefits in imposing such disclosure obligations, three major 
points can be added to your Paper:
a. All these countries have gone through similar assessments (Canada’s RIS system 
is closest to Australia’s), and have very similar consumption-based economies (except 
perhaps for China).
b. Explicitly (as in the Canadian provisions just quoted) or implicitly, importers in 
those countries have to monitor and disclose problems that arise with the goods they 
trade in even if those arise abroad. This means that prudent importers from our major 
trading partners will increasingly impose contractual obligations on their Australian 
exporters to disclose product-related problems that arise in Australia (and indeed third 
countries). This will make industry compliance costs for Australian exporters increasingly 
minimal, especially the more reputable ones dealing with reputable importers abroad. 
If compliance costs do rise for less reputable exporters, they seem particularly justified 
because those exporters threaten Australia’s reputation by risking injury to consumers 
abroad, and they may well also sell the same goods to Australian consumers. And an 
unfair situation is created if instead suppliers to our domestic market are not held to the 
same safety standards as those who export abroad.
c. Regarding instead the costs to the Australian government (p93 of your Paper), these 
can be minimised by integrating our new system particularly with the European one. Its 
RAPEX database of notifications is already already linked with other countries (through 
MoUs with China, the US, and possibly soon Japan). Maximising those efficiencies is 
another reason to extend Australia’s disclosure requirement to that in the 27 EU member 
states, namely serious risks as well as actual injuries. Inter-governmental information 
sharing obligations would also be a straightforward valuable addition to Australia’s 
burgeoning FTAs.55）
4. Other PC Report Recommendations cover goods-related services and reasonably 
foreseeable misuse of goods, government recall of ‘orphan goods’, etc. The EU and 
most of our other major trading partners already provide for these protections as well.
5. The ‘reasonable foreseeable misuse’ clarification was agreed in the PC’s final report 
55）　See Luke Nottage, ‘Asia-Pacific Regional Architecture and Consumer Product Safety Regulation for 
a Post-FTA Era’ Sydney Law School Research Paper No 09/125 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1509810> (accessed 26 July 2010).
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in 2006 after extensive consultation and criticism of an alternative formulation in its 
draft report of 2005. As your Paper reiterates (p 90), this is also consistent with product 
liability requirements under TPA Part VA, so extra compliance costs for (law-abiding) 
businesses should be minimal.
6. Similarly, all services should be provided safely under the TPA Part V Div 2 when 
there is a contractual relationship. This still adopts a negligence test, but there is a 
growing trend in our Asia-Pacific region to extend strict liability to suppliers of unsafe 
services anyway. The main advantage of clearly extending product safety obligations 
to goods-related services, under TPA Part V Div 1A, is to reduce costs and delays for 
regulators faced with arguments from businesses asserting that the problem is associated 
only with the service and not the goods.
7. At pp 88 and 91 it is stated that the ‘do nothing’ alternative would be ‘cost neutral 
for the government’. This neglects the significant costs to the government, but also 
taxpayers who subsidise litigation services, involved where businesses contest distinctions 
such as whether the problem arose from the ‘service’ or ‘goods’ themselves. The federal 
Attorney General has strongly criticised today’s dispute resolution system and various 
procedural and institutional reforms have been now been proposed. But prevention is 
usually better than cure.
8. At pp 81 and 91, there are omissions regarding a benefit involved in the government 
instead undertaking reform: ‘meeting reasonable consumer expectations about the role of 
the state in product safety’. This benefit is mentioned at p 94 regarding the disclosure 
requirement, and p 96 regarding recalls of orphan goods.
Fortunately, product safety re-regulation did survive this Consultation and RIS process. 
Provisions along the lines recommended by the PC were included in the Trade Practices 
Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill (No 2) 2010.＊ Unfortunately, despite my further 
Submissions and evidence given to the Senate Inquiry, the scope of the extra disclosure 
obligation imposed on suppliers under that enactment remains more restricted than in the US, 
the EU, China, Canada (probably) and even Japan. It only applies if there is actual serious 
injury for example; never if there is a risk – however obvious – but without a serious injury 
occurring.＊＊
  ＊　See <http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/economics_ctte/tpa_consumer_law_10/index.htm> 
(accessed 11 August 2010).
 ＊＊　See ibid and Luke Nottage ‘Proposed Australian (and Canadian) Requirements to Disclose Consumer 
Product Related Accidents: Better Late than Never?’ (May 2010) 10/41 Sydney Law School Research 
Paper <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1600502> (accessed 11 August 2010, also published in 20 Australian 
Product Liability Reporter).
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7.  Asia-Pacific Product Safety Regulation and Other Regional Architecture for 
a Post-FTA Era
(19 November 2009)
Imagine an international regime with these institutional features:
1. Virtually free trade in goods and services, including a ‘mutual recognition’ system 
whereby compliance with regulatory requirements in one jurisdiction (for example, 
qualifications to practice law or requirements to offering securities to the public) 
basically means exemption from compliance with regulations in the other jurisdiction. 
And for sensitive areas, such as food safety, there is a trans-national regulator.
2. Virtually free movement of capital, underpinned by private sector and governmental 
initiatives.
3. Permanent residence available to nationals from the other jurisdiction (and strong 
pressure to maintain flexible rules about multiple nationality).
4. Treaties for regulatory cooperation, simple enforcement of judgments (a court ruling 
in one jurisdiction is treated virtually identically to a ruling of a local court), and to 
avoid double taxation (including a system for taxpayer-initiated arbitration among the 
member states).
5. Government commitment to harmonising business law more widely, for example, now 
for consumer and competition law.
No, the answer is not the obvious one: I am NOT talking about the European Union (EU). 
I am referring to the Trans-Tasman framework built up between Australia and New Zealand, 
particularly over the last decade, sometimes through treaties (binding in international law) but 
sometimes in softer ways (for example, parallel legislation in each country). And since both 
countries are actively pursuing bilateral and now some regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), 
especially in the Asia-Pacific region, can’t at least some of these Trans-Tasman initiatives 
become a template for a broader ‘Asia Pacific Community’?
This question is particularly timely as the new DPJ-led government in Japan, has 
declared its support not only for the WTO system but also for FTAs (Free Trade Agreements), 
particularly in the Asian region.56） It also advocates improvements in food and consumer 
product safety measures.57） Whether or not Australia is considered part of Asia, either by 
56）　See Part 1.
57）　See Part 4.
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Japan or itself, the two countries are continuing bilateral FTA negotiations in the context of 
growing involvement in regional arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region. Such developments 
constituted one theme at the New Zealand Centre for International Economic Law conference, 
‘Trade Agreements: Where Do We Go From Here?’, over 22-23 October 2009 in Wellington. 
Below is an edited introduction to my four-part paper, now available in further updated form 
as a Sydney Law School Research Paper.58） 
More and more countries are entering into bilateral FTAs, including now throughout the 
Asia-Pacific region. This was not such a problem when the world economy was growing, but 
it and the multilateral WTO regime are now in crisis. Inefficient ‘trade diversion’ is likely 
even if bilateral FTA partners begin to connect up under regional FTAs, as under the recent 
ASEAN-Australian-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA).59） This is because 
greater liberalisation already achieved between bilateral FTA partners tends to be preserved 
under such regional agreements. And burgeoning FTAs diminish the incentives for national 
governments to press for a new multilateral system.60） 
Some therefore call for a ‘crisis Round’ to try to revive the system, but that seems 
unlikely.61） Another impediment is that the persuasiveness of conventional economic models, 
and market forces as the best way to maximise socio-economic growth, are under broader 
threat in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and now the meltdown in most real 
economies.62） 
One way forward is to concede that FTAs, already mostly sub-optimal from an narrow 
economic perspective, should include elements of ‘fair trade’ — not just ‘free trade’. Indeed, 
many economists might agree that if politicians, government officials and an increasingly 
broad array of stakeholders are increasingly investing so much time and resources in 
negotiating various FTAs anyway, the additional marginal costs involved in agreeing on some 
further matters may be quite minimal. Those costs are likely to be outweighed by marginal 
benefits, in the form of reductions in a variety of transaction costs currently incurred in 
managing risks in cross-border trade and investment.63） Legal practitioners do tend to be more 
aware of those costs and risks than governments and businesspeople. But anyway they also 
generally recognise many values other than those reflected in cost-benefit analysis, such as 
58）　Nottage, above n 55 
59）　Australian Government — Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand 
Free Trade Agreement’ <http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/fta/asean/aanzfta/> (accessed 26 July 2010).
60）　Brett Williams, ‘The Korea-Australia FTA: Obstacle or Building Block?’ (14 April 2009) <http://www.
eastasiaforum.org/2009/04/14/the-korea-australia-fta-obstacle-or-building-block/> (accessed 26 July 2010).
61）　Andrew Elek, ‘The Crisis and Reinventing WTO Negotiations’ (15 April 2009) <http://www.
eastasiaforum.org/2009/04/15/the-crisis-and-reinventing-wto-negotiations/> (accessed 26 July 2010).
62）　See Nottage, above n 18. But see now: John Quiggin Zombie Economics (Princeton University Press, 
2010).
63）　The Honourable JJ Spigelman AC, ‘Transaction Costs and International Litigation’, Address to the 
16th Inter-Pacific Bar Association Conference, Sydney (2 May 2006) <http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/
lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO_spigelman020506> (accessed 26 July 2010).
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participation rights or maintaining the coherence and overall integrity of a regulatory system.
In striving to balance free and fair trade nowadays, a rough analogy would be the ways in 
which the European Union (EU) has evolved so it is no longer just an economic community. 
Despite — or perhaps because of — the steady expansion of EU membership, it has addressed 
concerns about democratic legitimacy and accountability, alongside its original core objectives 
of free movement in people, capital, goods and services. The EU has achieved this over many 
decades, often by trial-and-error and in a variety of ways, ranging from core or additional 
treaties, diverse European law harmonisation measures, through to ‘soft law’ initiatives.
This analogy seems particularly timely for the Asia-Pacific region, for three main 
reasons. First, our region certainly remains diverse in terms of social and legal or political 
systems, but economic integration has burgeoned since the 1980s and will intensify even 
further as pan-Asian production networks (strongly connected with Japan64）) turn away 
from European and US markets in the wake of the GFC. The ‘diversity gap’ is narrowing 
significantly as the EU itself expands and becomes more diverse, at least when compared to 
East Asia, Australia and New Zealand.
Secondly, there remains considerable interest in Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s 
for a new ‘Asia Pacific Community’. Proposed last year in rather inchoate form, including 
whether and how this new concept might include any EU-like institutional features, in 
December it will be discussed by regional leaders in Sydney and probably then at the APEC 
meeting in Singapore.65） Many remain skeptical.66） But Yukio Hatoyama also wrote shortly 
before Japan’s general election this year about the need now to strengthen institutions in 
Asia, ranging from financial system infrastructure to human rights institutions.67） And his new 
government now appears to be pressing for some sort of East Asian Community (centred on 
Japan and China, initially without the US).68） 
Thirdly, throughout the region, considerable distrust has re-emerged about leaving socio-
economic ordering to outright market fundamentalism. Although some assert that market 
forces have long prevailed in Japan, for example, most agree instead that post-War Japanese 
capitalism has maintained distinctive norms (such as close business-government relations) 
and institutions (such as ‘main banks’) that help explain why even the far-reaching reforms 
to corporate governance since the 1990s still only amount to a gradual transformation.69） 
64）　See Part 8.
65）　Greg Sheridan, ‘Rudd’s New Vision for Asia-Pacific’ <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/
rudds-new-vision-for-asia-pacific/story-e6frg76f-1225772087960> (accessed 26 July 2010).
66）　See eg <http://www.asialink.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/23898/Heseltine_essay7.pdf> 
(accessed 11 August 2010).
67）　Joel Rathus, ‘Japan, the DPJ and Regional Financial Arrangements’ (11 August 2009) <http://www.
eastasiaforum.org/2009/08/11/japan-the-djp-and-regional-financial-arrangements/> (accessed 26 July 2010).
68）　Aurelia George Mulgan, ‘Responses to Hatoyama’s Middle-power Diplomacy’ (28 September 2009) 
<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/09/28/7199/> (accessed 26 July 2010).
69）　Luke Nottage, Leon Wolff and Kent Anderson, ‘Japan’s Gradual Transformation in Corporate 
Governance’ Sydney Law School Research Paper No 08/29 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ ↗
New Legislative Agendas, Legal Professionals and Dispute Resolution in Australia and Japan: 2009-2010R.  L.  R. 57
Rudd has consistently protested about the excesses of market fundamentalism, although it 
remains to be seen whether for example how far this will translate into reforms to consumer 
protection legislation in Australia — likely also to be followed in New Zealand.70） Such 
views underpinned his electoral victory in 2007 (although a wind-back of labour market 
deregulation was a much higher profile issue), but also Hatoyama’s election victory this 
August. The new Japanese government appears likely to intensify measures to promote 
consumer rights and product safety, while simultaneously promoting actively both the WTO 
system and bilateral or regional FTAs.71） 
What is likely therefore to emerge — or, at least, what we should now be encouraging 
— is deeper and broader economic integration in the Asia-Pacific (or at least Australasia) that 
simultaneously incorporates regulatory safeguards to meet the challenges and expectations 
of our brave new post-GFC world. These innovations may be built into FTAs or negotiated 
out alongside them, but it needs to be done in a more concerted and comprehensive manner. 
Part II of my full paper online therefore explains various options for promoting ‘free but fair’ 
movements of capital, people and services. Part III addresses free movement of consumer 
goods combined with better safety regulation: the WTO backdrop, the European approach, 
and some Asia-Pacific developments (especially Trans-Tasman). Part IV concludes that such 
initiatives to marry liberalisation with contemporary public interest concerns are essential to 
sustainable development in the Asia-Pacific region — and hence, potentially, to reinvigorating 
the multilateral order.72） 
B. Legal Professionals and Dispute Resolution
8.  Australia and Japan: A New Economic [and Legal!] Partnership in Asia
(12 October 2009)
Emeritus Professor Peter Drysdale recently presented in Sydney a preview of his now-
published consultancy report for Austrade, which urges:73）
a paradigm shift in thinking about Australia’s relationship with the Japanese economy. 
The Japanese market is no longer confined to Japan itself. It is a huge international 
market generated by the activities of Japanese business and investors, especially via 
↘ papers.cfm?abstract_id=1121510> (accessed 26 July 2010).
70）　See Part 3.
71）　See Part 4.
72）　For more in response to Euro-skeptics, see also my blog on the East Asia Forum: Nottage, above n 
53.
73）　Peter Drysdale, ‘Time to Re-think the Economic Partnership with Japan in Asia’ (12 September 2009) 
<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/09/13/time-to-re-think-the-economic-partnership-with-japan-in-asia/> 
(accessed 2 August 2010), p 3.
Ritsumeikan Law Review No. 28, 201158
production networks in Asia. It is a market enhanced by the economic cooperation 
programs of the Japanese government throughout the developing world, particularly in 
the Asian and Pacific region. And it is a market in which Japanese business now plays 
an increasingly important role from an Australian base in manufacturing, agriculture and 
services.
The Australian Financial Review also confirms that Japan has led China and other Asian 
investors into Australia over the previous year.74） But many probably remain unaware of these 
facts highlighted by Drysdale’s report:75） 
The stock of Japanese investment in Asia amounted to A$ 180 billion out of Japan’s 
global investment of A$ 772 billion at end-2008. The flow of export and import trade 
which Japanese business generates in Asia each year was US$ 690 billion in 2008. 
Procurements through Japanese corporate subsidiaries in Asia amount to A$ 1.2 trillion 
annually. In addition, Japan spent A$ 11 billion (901 billion yen) in Asia on Overseas 
Development Assistance programs and procurement through economic cooperation 
programs. Japanese business has now also established a platform for export to the 
region from Australia, with diversified investments across food, manufacturing as well as 
resources, that already delivers A$ 6 billion in Australian sales to Asian markets other 
than Japan. These are all large new elements in the economic relationship with Japan 
beyond the A$ 51 billion export trade and A$ 20 billion import trade that Australia 
already does each year with Japan itself.
These pervasive economic ties are underpinned by very wide-ranging and stable relations 
between Australia and Japan at all sorts of levels: governmental, judicial, educational, working 
holidays, and so on. As pointed out in another recent report, the GFC has led policy-makers 
as well as businesspeople to look again more favourably on relationships that combine lower 
risk with less return, compared to high risk/return ventures.76）
We can take advantage of these strong and still very profitable Australia-Japan bilateral 
relationships, as well as the investment and trading links each country (especially Japan) 
has developed in other parts of Asia particularly since the 1990s, by more actively joining 
Australian and Japanese partners for ventures throughout Asia. This spreads the risks typically 
associated with the possibility of higher returns, and also allows each partner to contribute 
goods or services in which that country has more of a comparative advantage. Thus, for 
74）　‘What Crisis? Asian Investors Rush to our Shores’, 24 September 2009.
75）　Ibid, pp 3-4.
76）　Manuel Panagiotopolous and Andrew Cornell, ‘Australia and Japan: Beyond the Mainstream’ <http://
www.ajf.australia.or.jp/docs/20090625_AJF_Manuel_Panagiotopoulos_Business.pdf> (accessed 2 August 
2010).
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example, Drysdale suggests:77）
partnership with Australian services firms in finance, legal services and engineering 
could be mutual productive. … In FTA talks with Japan the Rudd Government is 
trying to open the way for professional and financial services firms to set up in Japan, 
encouraging wider recognition of qualifications and the removal of barriers to obtaining 
licences in Japan.
As an example of ‘legal and consultancy services’, Drysdale mentions that several 
Australian law firms have long experience in the Asian region, and gives the example of 
Mallesons Japan. But he concludes that ‘if we are serious about joining global supply chains 
and capturing service industry opportunities in Asia then Australian firms need to be there on 
the ground to capture the business’.
Unfortunately, unlike the major US and European law firms, neither Mallesons Japan 
nor any other Australian law firm had taken sufficient advantage of the now fully-liberalised 
and growing market for international legal services in Tokyo (described in a recent lecture 
by International Bar Association Vice-President and ANJeL Advisor, Mr Akira Kawamura).78） 
A major opportunity opened up especially when full profit-sharing partnerships between 
Japanese and international lawyers were permitted from 2004, and many young Australian 
law graduates are now directly joining the Tokyo offices of US or UK law firms rather than 
going first through their head offices. If Australian law firms could also establish offices in 
Tokyo, they too would not only access burgeoning markets there, but also be better placed 
to pursue opportunities in other parts of Asia. For example, they could use their home client 
base to help link up Australian firms with firms in Japan interested in joint ventures in 
Asia. And the Tokyo office could liaise, for example, with an office say in Shanghai when 
its Australian client found itself dealing with a joint venture in China that in fact involves 
significant Japanese interests.
Educational services is another area where Australia has significant expertise as well 
as demonstrated export market potential, and this extends to legal education. For example, 
through the Australian Network for Japanese Law79） Sydney Law School partners primarily 
with Ritsumeikan Law School to offer intensive Kyoto and Tokyo Seminars comparing 
Japanese law.80） These are offered not only to Australian and Japanese students, but also 
to students travelling from other parts of Asia (especially Hong Kong and Singapore). 
Through its 400-strong membership, ANJeL coordinates lecturers comprising professors and 
77）　Ibid, p 25.
78）　See Luke Nottage, ‘Kawamura Connections: Tokyo Lawyers Go Global, All the Way With the IBA’ 
(23 September 2009) <http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/2009/09/kawamura_connections_tokyo_law_1.
html> (accessed 2 August 2010).
79）　See ANJeL, <http://sydney.edu.au/law/anjel/> (accessed 11 August 2010).
80）　See Kyoto Seminar, <http://www.kyoto-seminar.jp> (accessed 11 August 2010).
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practitioners from Australia and all around Japan, not limited to those at or already known to 
Ritsumeikan. 
As another recent example, the Centre for Asian and Pacific Law at the University of 
Sydney (CAPLUS81）) worked with our Research Institute for the Asia Pacific (RIAP82）) to bid 
successfully for a United Nations ‘legal technical assistance’ project to support a South-East 
Asian government interested in implementing judicial sector reform. The government was 
particularly interested in comparing Japan, China, Indonesia (for all three of which CAPLUS 
has particular expertise), Korea (where CAPLUS has close contacts) and Russia. Again in 
conjunction with ANJeL, we were able to bring in some Japanese partners to assist with the 
criminal justice aspects of the report on Japan. Those Japanese partners alone, again, would 
have been unlikely to have attempted such a project. Combining Australian with Japanese 
expertise therefore opens up another possibility for exporting legal education services to 
another part of Asia. 
In sum, developments are already occurring in some law-related fields that illustrate 
Drysdale’s thesis very well. But there is certainly scope for doing much more, for example 
through more direct engagement with the legal services market in Tokyo on the part of 
Australia’s law firms.＊ The key now is to think regionally (and globally), not just bilaterally.
9.  Legal Education and the Profession in Australia, Japan, and Beyond
(7 October 2009)
Following on from my previous report on Mr Akira Kawamura’s talk in Sydney about the 
significant transformations impacting on the legal profession in Japan, East Asia and world-
wide, let us briefly consider also some inter-related changes to legal education in our 
region.83） ANJeL Judges-in-Residence Program Convenor84） Stacey Steele was Co-edited, 
with Kathryn Taylor, ‘Legal Education in East Asia: Globalisation, Change and Contexts’85） 
to commemorate the late Professor Mal Smith, who did so much for ANJeL, Australia-Japan 
relations, and legal education particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. ANJeL Co-director Kent 
81）　See <http://www.sydney.edu.au/law/caplus> (accessed 11 August 2010).
82）　The University of Sydney, ‘Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific’ <http://www.usyd.edu.au/riap/> 
(accessed 2 August 2010).
  ＊　An Australian law firm subsequently announced it will venture into the burgeoning legal services 
market in Tokyo: see "Blake Dawson First to Open Japan Office", Australian Financial Review 
(Friday 23 October 2009) and <http://www.blakedawson.com/Templates/News/x_news_content_page.
aspx?id=56941> (accessed 11 August 2010).
83）　Nottage, below n 85.
84）　See ANJeL Program Convenors, above n 14.
85）　Stacey Steele and Kathryn Taylor (eds), Legal Education in Asia: Globalization, Change and 
Contexts (London, New York, Routledge, 2010). See also <http://www.routledge.com/books/
details/9780415494335/> (accessed 3 August 2010).
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Anderson and Competitions Program Convenor86） Trevor Ryan have contributed a very useful 
chapter on ‘Gatekeepers: A Comparative Critique of Admission to the Legal Profession and 
Japan’s New Law Schools’, which they and Stacey kindly shared with me in manuscript 
form.87） 
Hopefully without stealing too much of their thunder, I would like to extend it to 
locate especially Australian legal education. Below are my opening remarks for a co-
authored National Report on Topic I.D ‘The Role of Practice in Legal Education’ for the 
18th International Congress of Comparative Law, held four-yearly in different venues — this 
time from 25 July 2010 in Washington DC.88） Through the Sydney Centre for International 
Law, Professor Cheryl Saunders, Justice James Douglas and I have arranged for many other 
National Reporters on diverse topics selected for the Congress.89） We can also expect there 
many National Reports from Japan, although none were volunteered for the same Legal 
Education topic. There remains considerable uncertainty about Japan’s new postgraduate 
‘Law School’ programs and their relationship to the National Legal Examination system, as I 
explained in a paper first presented a conference organised by Stacey in Melbourne where the 
‘gatekeeper’ framework was first unveiled.90）
Overall, but focusing especially on Japan, Kent Anderson and Trevor Ryan show how 
legal education and entry to the legal profession can usefully be analysed by comparing 
who acts as ‘gatekeeper’ to the profession. One possible gatekeeper is the legal profession 
itself. Traditionally, in England, this comprises solicitors and barristers, who administer 
qualification examinations. This system has also been influential in former British colonies 
like Australia.91）
However, an alternative gatekeeper is the university system. Countries like Australia 
(and New Zealand) have moved mainly to this model since around the 1960s, by basically 
requiring all lawyers to have passed an LLB or similar (undergraduate or initial) law degree. 
(NSW is unusual in retaining an alternative, perhaps reflecting the strength of the profession 
vis-à-vis universities in that state. The Legal Profession Admission Board allows students 
86）　See ANJeL Program Convenors, above n 14.
87）　Kent Anderson and Trevor Ryan, ‘Gatekeepers: A Comparative Critique of Admission to the Legal 
Profession and Japan’s New Law Schools’ in Stacey Steele and Kathryn Taylor (eds), Legal Education 
in Asia: Globalization, Change and Contexts (Routledge, London, 2010), Chapter 3.
88）　‘International Academy of Comparative law’ <http://www.iuscomparatum.org/>. For the National 
Report co-authored with Justice Douglas, greatly assisted by Sydney Law School student Alicia Lyons, 
see <http://sydney.edu.au/law/scil/documents/2010/wp_no_27_Role_of_Practice_In_Legal_Ed.pdf> (both 
accessed 3 August 2010).
89）　Sydney Law School, ‘Sydney Centre for International Law’ <http://sydney.edu.au/law/scil/> (accessed 
3 August 2010).
90）　Luke Nottage, ‘Build Postgraduate Law Schools in Kyoto, and Will They Come — Sooner and 
Later?’ (2005) 7(3) Australian Journal of Asian Law 241, also available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=986529> (accessed 3 August 2010).
91）　Christoph Antons, ‘Legal Education in Australia’ (2001) 22 Kansai University Review of Law and 
Politics 71 [Scanned PDF may be available from Luke Nottage on request].
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instead to study for its exams, mostly in evening classes, preparing students for the Diploma 
in Law — treated as equivalent to an LLB for qualifying as a lawyer in NSW. This program 
is nominally affiliated with the University of Sydney, but instructors and course content are 
quite separate from its Law School.92）) It is true that throughout Australia there are now-short 
programs for Practical Legal Training (PLT) necessary in addition to an LLB for admission 
as lawyers, and these administered, for example, in NSW primarily by the ‘College of 
Law’, but some law schools sometimes administer those too (for example, the University of 
Technology in Sydney). 
Nonetheless, Australia also has affinities with a model centred on a third possible 
gatekeeper: the market (for law graduates). The US epitomises this model because basically 
anyone can pass even the hardest state bar examination – but if only after multiple attempts 
or with poor results, that person will not be able to compete in the market and get a good 
job as a lawyer (especially if also a graduate from a less well-regarded law school or 
with poor university grades). Australia is similar because the proliferation of law schools 
particularly since the late 1980s allows basically everyone to get some form of LLB, and 
basically everyone can pass the short PLT programs if they can afford them. But if someone’s 
university grades are underwhelming, s/he will find it very difficult to actually practice as 
lawyers.
Australia also shows some influence from a model centred on a fourth gatekeeper: 
the state. This arises because the government funds universities, especially through limited 
numbers of Commonwealth Supported Places (CSP) for many students undertaking LLB 
degrees — whereby students pay lower fees to the law schools, and the government pays 
them a subsidy per student. Yet, as explained below, Australia has witnessed not only 
the emergence of a few private law schools since the late 1980s. There is also a growing 
tendency for public law schools to seek full-fee-paying LLB students (as well as international 
students, and LLM or other similar postgraduate students, who are always full-fee-paying 
— note however that an LLM or such qualification does not allow admission to the legal 
profession). Still, this situation remains very different from (more ‘civil law tradition’) 
countries like Germany or Japan,93） where the state — with more or less consultation with the 
legal profession – sets a national legal examination. (Usually the latter also opens up careers 
in the judiciary or procuracy, not just as lawyers, and often therefore it is accompanied by 
some post-exam training at state rather than private expense.)
Australia’s legacy of the legal profession itself as a gatekeeper is reflected not only in 
the NSW LPAB exams alternative to the LLB, but also more generally in the profession’s 
92）　Compare the websites of the Law Extension Committee and the Sydney Law School, respectively at 
<http://www.usyd.edu.au/lec/> (accessed 3 August 2010) and <http://www.law.usyd.edu.au> (accessed 3 
August 2010).
93）　Masaki Abe and Luke Nottage, ‘Japanese Law’ in Jan Smit (ed), Encyclopedia Of Comparative Law 
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2006), updated at <http://www.asianlii.org/jp/other/JPLRes/2008/1.html> 
(accessed 3 August 2010).
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broad control over what must be taught in the LLB (the ‘Priestley 11’, named after a 
committee chaired by a then-Judge). Combined with a (possibly accelerating) shift towards 
the market as major gatekeeper to the profession, this generates strong pressures to make 
legal education ‘practice-oriented’ even in universities. However, their law schools are 
increasingly integrated in wider academic communities, nationally and internationally, and the 
government also has interests in law students graduating with a broader perspective (as well 
as incentivising law schools in other ways by offering funding for research, not necessarily 
linked to teaching). The net effect since the 1970s, at least until recently, has been for law 
school education to become less practice-oriented and more interdisciplinary and theoretical – 
although less so, for example, compared to the top US law schools.94） Whether this balance 
is optimal or sustainable is difficult to assess, but was debated in broader comparative and 
theoretical perspective in Washington DC in July 2010.＊
10.  Japan’s Legal Profession (and ADR and Legal Education) at a Crossroads
(17 March 2010)
Japanese bengoshi lawyers, as the most influential group within the legal profession, 
stand at a crossroads. Overall, through the overarching Japan Federation of Bar Associations 
(JFBA), their work and attitudes have become more amenable to collaborating with the 
judiciary and even public prosecutors in implementing reforms to the litigation system; to 
increasing the numbers allowed to pass the National Legal Examination as the gateway 
to careers as a lawyer, judge or prosecutor; and even to allowing Japan’s many ‘quasi-
lawyers’ to expand their legal practice, as well as more promotion of privately-supplied ADR 
services.95） Reforms in all these areas were propelled by the Judicial Reform Council’s final 
recommendations to the Prime Minister in 2001, but they were consistent with the trajectory 
of bengoshi as a whole. However, the controversial election of a new JFBA President may 
derail all this, with implications also for related initiatives such as Japan’s new postgraduate 
‘Law School’ programs inaugurated in 2004.
94）　See, for example, Michael Coper, ‘Law Reform and Legal Education: Uniting Separate Worlds’ 
(2007-8) 39 University of Toledo Law Review 233, and Luke Nottage, ‘International Arbitration and 
Commercial Law Education for an International World’, in M Deguchi and M Storme (eds), The 
Reception and Transmission of Civil Procedural Law in the Global Society (Maklu, Antwerp/Apeldoorn, 
2008), also CDAMS Discussion Paper No 04/30E; Sydney Law School Research Paper No 07/84 at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=838030> (accessed 3 August 2010), both containing further references; and 
Patrick Keyzer (ed) Community Engagement in Contemporary Legal Education: Pro Bono, Clinical 
Legal Education and Service-Learning (Halstead Press, Sydney, 2009).
  ＊　For the General Report, drawing also on many other National Reports, see <https://www.wcl.
american.edu/events/2010congress/reports/> (accessed 11 August 2010), or contact me for details. See 
also my Review Essay of the rest of the book edited by Steele and Taylor, at <http://www.ssrn.com/
author=488525>
95）　See Part 9.
Ritsumeikan Law Review No. 28, 201164
Until the 1960s, bengoshi and the JFBA were primarily concerned at increasing their 
status vis-à-vis prosecutors and the courts — implying the need to cap numbers passing the 
National Legal Examination — and serving as a ‘noble opposition’ to government as well as 
promoting a strict vision of the rule of law. By the 1980s, more confident in their status and 
financial circumstances, they had mostly shifted towards a more collaborative relationship. 
This aimed at extending the rule of law even for example through ADR mechanisms, 
beginning with a 1978 scheme with insurers to resolve traffic accident disputes, followed by 
the establishment of Bar Association ADR Centres from 1990.
Since the 1990s, prompted by more radical proposals from certain business and 
government interests for deregulating and expanding the legal profession, some bengoshi 
(for example, in the emergent corporate law firms) began to see themselves as advancing the 
public good and the rule of law by becoming mainly private suppliers of even more varied 
legal services.96） This vision not only implies a greater willingness to increase bengoshi 
numbers, but also to allow expansion in numbers and roles of (more or less) competing 
‘quasi-lawyers’ and even non-legal professionals specialising in ADR. The influence of this 
view even among bengoshi provides one explanation for the many recommendations emerging 
from the JRC in 2001 and their implementation over 2001-4.＊
However, this latest view probably remains a minority one among bengoshi. Many 
bengoshi are still (often older) practitioners leading or working in sole or small practices, and 
even those in Tokyo or Osaka do not derive most of their work from corporate clients — 
certainly not transactional work, as opposed to litigation. It is quite unsurprising, therefore, 
that there has been a visible backlash by this more conservative majority in the recent 
election of the JFBA President, despite not initially having support from any of the largest — 
and generally more liberal — Bar Associations (three in Tokyo plus Osaka). As reported in 
the Mainichi Daily News on 11 March 2010:97）
Lawyer Kenji Utsunomiya, 63, has been elected the next president of the Japan 
Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA). JFBA presidents had traditionally been elected 
from candidates backed by the most powerful members in the country’s major bar 
associations. However, Utsunomiya, who is widely recognised as an expert in multiple 
debt issues, broke the trend by defeating rival candidate Takeji Yamamoto, 66, who was 
96）　See R Hamano, ‘The Turn to Law: The Emergence of Corporate Law Firms in Japan’ in William 
Alford (ed) Raising the Bar: The Emerging Legal Profession in East Asia (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard 
University Press, 2007).
  ＊　See the Final Report at <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html> and ‘Ensuring 
that the Results of the Justice System Reform Take Root’ <http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/issues/
issues01.html > (both accessed 11 August 2010).
97）　‘Lawyer Beats Powerful Interests, Tradition to Become Bar Association Federation President’ (11 
March 2010) <http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20100311p2a00m0na016000c.html> (accessed 17 
March 2010).
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backed by the current JFBA leadership. 
As the overcrowded legal profession became a major campaign issue, Utsunomiya’s 
proposal to reduce the number of people passing the bar exam to 1,500 a year gained 
broad support from regional bar associations concerned about over-heated competition 
and job security at law firms. Meanwhile, Yamamoto, who also proposed a downsizing 
of the legal community, failed to present a specific target.
To qualify as the winner, a JFBA presidential candidate is required to gain a 
majority vote in at least a third of all 52 bar associations nationwide. In the first round 
of voting in February, Yamamoto beat out Utsunomiya by 976 votes. However, as 
Utsunomiya won a majority in 42 associations, a second poll was called on Wednesday, 
in which Utsunomiya bested Yamamoto by 9,720 votes to 8,284, winning in 46 
associations.
All 28,700 or so lawyers in Japan had voting rights in the presidential election, with 
a turnout rate of 63.19 percent. Currently, about 60 percent of the nation’s lawyers belong 
to either one of the three major bar associations in Tokyo or the one in Osaka, and 
the candidates supported by the major parties in these associations had always won the 
presidential elections. However Yamamoto, who despite gaining the backing of the four 
associations in the latest campaign, failed to win a majority in Osaka in the second vote.
A native of Ehime Prefecture and a member of the Tokyo Bar Association, 
Utsunomiya started his career as an attorney in 1971. He is a leading expert in consumer 
affairs, and serves as an acting general manager for the JFBA task force for multiple 
debt issues, as well as a director of a support group for victims of crimes committed by 
Aum Shinrikyo cult members. He will be officially appointed as the new president in 
April and lead the federation for the next two years.
This latest development will make it difficult to pursue further deregulation of bengoshi, 
and the legal profession more generally (‘unification of the profession’ or hoso ichigen in 
its broadest sense).98） That in turn will have a large impact on reform issues such as the 
expansion of private ADR, as well as the new Law Schools which are already struggling with 
a National Legal Examination pass rate of only 30 per cent compared to the 70-80 per cent 
envisaged by the JRC.99）
98）　See para 7-230 of K Ishida and V Taylor, ‘The Legal Profession of Japan’ in Luke Nottage (Exec 
Ed), CCH Japan Business Law Guide (Singapore, CCH Asia, 2008).
99）　Luke Nottage, ‘Interpreting the Results of Japan’s first National Legal Examination’ (18 October 
2006) <http://sydney.edu.au/law/anjel/documents/ResearchPublications/Results_of_Japans_first_National_
Legal_Examination.pdf> (accessed 3 August 2010).
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11.  Will Privately-Supplied ADR Keep Growing in Japan?
(17 March 2010)
The shift since the 1990s in the self-image of many bengoshi lawyers outlined above,100） 
underpinned also by the slowly changing nature of their work generally as well as the 
emergence of corporate law firms, helps explain the quite swift enactment of the 2004 Law to 
Promote the Use of Out-of-Court Dispute Resolution Procedures,101） driven also by a Judicial 
Reform Council (JRC) recommendation in 2001.102） After a slow start, the Law also seemed 
to be gaining some traction in promoting privately-supplied ADR services. 
However, Court-annexed mediation and recent improvements in the litigation process 
itself leave a formidable competitor. And the conservative backlash among bengoshi in 
electing their new JFBA President is likely to further dampen the emergence of private 
ADR services and institutions. Especially now, that only seems probable if and when private 
suppliers develop niche markets like more facilitative (not evaluative) forms of ADR — a 
characteristic of ADR in Australia that has impressed ANJeL’s Visiting Professor Tatsuya 
Nakamura — and if litigation costs balloon like they have in countries like Australia.103）
Out of the reform debates regarding the 2004 Law, the view did emerge that promoting 
ADR, not just better court procedures, was consistent with the rule of law — the ultimate aim of 
judicial sector reform. ADR could complement court proceedings if it could help bring disputing 
parties closer together ‘in the shadow of the law’ cast by an improved system of courts (and, 
of course, predictable substantive law). ADR could also advance the vision of the JRC (and the 
government more generally) of more informed and active citizens, taking greater responsibility 
for their own actions rather than relying passively on guidance from public authorities.
A second debate that emerged, particularly within the Study Group set up in late 2001 
to propose concrete elements of the new legislation to promote ADR, was whether ADR 
providers should be licenced, certified or completely deregulated.104）
Ultimately, although not mentioned by the JRC recommendations, the Group and the 
Law provided a MoJ certification scheme. The rationale was that this was needed to promote 
public trust in ADR, given already the active use of Court-annexed conciliation on the one 
hand, and on the other the continuing involvement of yakuza gangsters and other undesirable 
providers of dispute resolution ‘services’ in Japan. This view prevailed over those who argued 
100）　See Part 10.
101）　Law No 151 of 2004. Translation available at ‘Japanese Law Translation’, above n 33.
102）　The Justice System Reform Council, ‘Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council: For 
a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century’ (12 June 2001) <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/
policy/sihou/singikai/990612_e.html> (accessed 3 August 2010).
103）　See his columns in Japanese reproduced at ANJeL, ‘ANJeL Research Publications’ <http://sydney.edu.
au/law/anjel/content/anjel_research_pub.html> (accessed 3 August 2010).
104）　For both debates and the following summary of the outcomes, see Aya Yamada, ‘ADR in Japan: Does 
the New Law Liberalize ADR from Historical Shackles or Legalize It?’ (2009) 2 Contemporary Asia 
Arbitration Journal 1 at 15-16.
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that liberalisation would have been more consistent with the goal of promoting private ADR 
and the broader deregulatory program of the government. Liberalisation was also seen as too 
much of a shift from the starting point, which was close to licencing: Art 72 of the Lawyers 
Law (criminally) prohibited legal services provided other than by bengoshi except when (i) 
not offered on a (continuing) business basis, (ii) a legitimate act, or (iii) other legislation 
provided differently.105） 
The Law’s certification scheme represented a compromise aimed to placate bengoshi by 
coming within exception (iii), while appealing to those sceptical about too much government 
control over the ADR services industry. It offers a ‘carrot’ (to encourage certification by ADR 
providers) rather than using a ‘stick’ (forcing providers to get licenced before they provide 
services). Providers do not need to become certified, although then there is a risk that they 
may violate the Lawyers Law unless they fit within another exception to Art 72. But if they 
do get certified, they obtain three specific advantages:
• If their procedure ends without the parties settling and one sues within a month, the 
prescription period is calculated as if the suit had been brought on the date the claim 
was filed with the certified ADR procedure (Art 25);
• If a suit is pending but parties agree to use the certified procedure or it is already 
underway, the court may suspend litigation proceedings for up to four months (Art 26; 
compare court-annexed conciliation, where there is no time limit);
• Parties can elect to use certified ADR instead of the court-annexed system (Art 27) 
if other legislation requires conciliation before litigation (for example, land or building 
rent disputes under Civil Conciliation Law Art 24-2(1) or divorces under the Domestic 
Relations Adjudication Law — kaji shimpan ho).106）
Certification also provides the more diffuse benefit or marketing point of showing the 
public that the private institution (or individual) has fulfilled minimum standards detailed in Art 6, 
and is not disqualified under Art 7 (for example, a yakuza member). These standards are mostly 
procedural (for example, it must clarify a standard process from commencement to termination, 
including notices and grounds for termination), and mostly consistent with international 
standards (for example, ISO 10003, but not including a confidentiality requirement). 
After a slow start (only 5 by November 2007) there has been an almost exponential 
growth in certified ADR providers (26 by January 2009 and 61 by March 2010).107） Of 
the current 61 institutions, 4 are local Bar Associations but 9 are local Judicial Scriveners 
105）　Law No 87 of 2005.
106）　Law No 222 of 1951.
107）　See, in Japanese, ‘Kaiketsu Sapoto Ichiran [Resolution Support Synopsis]’ <http://www.moj.go.jp/
KANBOU/ADR/jigyousya/ninsyou-index.html> (accessed 3 August 2010) and my graph below compiled 
thanks to ANJeL Assistant Glenn Kembrey.
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Associations (many shihoshoshi being engaged now, for example, in resolving consumer 
credit disputes) and one is the Tokyo Administrative Scriveners Association.
There is no comprehensive data on whether certification has led directly to much more 
filings and cases being resolved through these providers of ADR (which the Law defines 
as processes to encourage settlement, thus excluding arbitration from its scope). Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that this has not yet occurred, and that public knowledge and trust remains 
lower than for court- or government-administered ADR. However, businesses do seem to be 
settling cases more often at an earlier stage through the certified bodies (or even in direct 
negotiations) because they wish to avoid the more formalised mediation process.108） 
A second effect is a growing diversification in ADR providers. Many certified are 
smaller and/or newer bodies specialising, for example, in labour or social security related 
disputes. The Japan Industrial Counselors Association also adopts a more facilitative style 
of mediation, in contrast to Court-annexed (and even Bar Association Centre) evaluative 
mediation. (Others like the JCAA or the Sports Arbitration Centre have obtained certification 
with the goal of expanding their services to include mediation.) Other government agencies 
have become more interested in privately-supplied ADR. For example, METI in 2008 allowed 
those certified under the MoJ to obtain further METI certification to become involved in 
mediations under the Law on Special Measures for Industry Revitalisation.
Thirdly, due to the certification standards the providers have started to become more 
conscious about the need for transparency and structure in designing and implementing 
their various dispute resolution processes. For example, in the industry-association based PL 
ADR Centres for consumers’ product defect related claims (two of which are now certified), 
many cases have been resolved without proceeding to a cheap but formal mediation thanks 
to Centre staff engaged in ‘shuttle diplomacy’ (often by free-dial phone or by exchange of 
108）　See Yamada, above n 104, pp 20-1, also regarding the following three other likely effects of the Law 
so far.
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documentation).109） However, now they are more conscious of the need to maintain due process 
standards (including confidentiality, adopted voluntarily by the Centres) even at this stage.
Lastly, networking is emerging among ADR providers. For example, the (certified) 
Osaka Bar Association tries to work in with other providers, as do now some of the Ho-
terasu offices. Mediators registered under the Civil Conciliation Law are also starting to up-
skill through training offered by private certified ADR providers.
These amount to small but very significant changes, underpinned by earlier attempts 
from bengoshi to become more involved in ADR and in turn likely to reinforce their 
involvement (although not necessarily so much in Bar Association ADR Centres). However, 
Court-annexed ADR is extremely well-established due to its long history, public trust in the 
judiciary, and low cost (with registered mediators so far accepting low wages for the honour 
and opportunity of serving in Civil Conciliation Law proceedings). Another challenge to (even 
certified) privately-provided ADR services comes from a further round of reforms to the Code 
of Civil Procedure, in effect from 2004 (and also reflecting some JRC recommendations).110） 
This opens more avenues to the courts and may also make it easier to settle disputes within 
the litigation process. For example, these amendments:
• allow parties to seek opinions from expert advisors before formally lodging suit;
• encourage more use of expert witnesses (kanteinin) during proceedings; and 
• introduce a system of ‘expert commissioners’ (semmon i’in) who can provide 
explanations in writing or orally before the parties and, with their consent, even attend 
settlement conferences to facilitate settlement or attend witness examinations to ask 
questions.
12.  Judicial Education and Training in Japan
(1 April 2010)
To qualify as a lawyer (bengoshi) with full rights to give legal advice and represent clients — 
and also to be appointed as a senior court judge or public prosecutor — candidates must pass 
the National Legal Examination (shiho shiken), and then be trained at the Legal Research 
and Training Institute (LRTI). University legal education still takes place primarily at the 
undergraduate level. Every year, about 45,000 students graduate with a Bachelor of Laws. 
However, most of them do not become lawyers, instead finding employment in governmental 
organs or private corporations, because it has been extremely difficult to pass the National 
109）　See also my paper with Yoshitaka Wada, ‘Japan’s New Product Liability ADR Centers: Bureaucratic, 
Industry, or Consumer Informalism?’ (1998) 6 Journal of Japanese Law 40, also available at <http://
ssrn.com/abstract=837965> (accessed 3 August 2010). 
110）　See Luke Nottage, ‘Civil Procedure Reforms in Japan: The Latest Round’ (2005) 22 Ritsumeikan 
University Law Review 81, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=837864> (accessed 3 August 2010).
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Legal Examination. In 2004, while more than 40,000 people took the Examination, less than 
1,500 examinees passed. The number of successful examinees is intentionally limited. The 
number was 500 in 1990, then gradually increased to 1,000 in 2000, and to around 1500 
in 2004. It was expected to rise to around 3,000 per annum in 2010, as part of a broader 
program of judicial reforms underway since 2001, but the recent election of a new President 
for the Japan Federation of Bar Associations now makes this very unlikely.111）
Another aspect of the agenda advanced by the Judicial Reform Council (JRC) related to 
the training of prospective legal professionals was the inauguration of 68 new postgraduate 
‘Law Schools’ from April 2004. However, although it is easier for their (carefully selected) 
students to pass a ‘New Legal Examination’ (shin-shiho shiken), it remains one of the most 
difficult in Japan — with a pass rate of about 30 per cent. The old shiho shiken, which could 
be attempted without any university degree, has been gradually phased out to allow the new 
Law Schools to get established, although (as recommended by the JRC in 2001) a small 
new scheme will be introduced to allow those unable to afford Law School to still qualify to 
become a bengoshi, prosecutor or Judge.
But what happens after this Examination and when one joins the almost 3,000-strong 
judiciary in Japan? Judicial training is comparatively under-researched.＊ First, all those who 
have passed the Examination receive the same further but more practical legal training at the 
LRTI, administered by the Supreme Court and funded out of the judiciary’s budget. The five 
courses taught in this Division of the LRTI comprise criminal and civil litigation (keiji and 
minji saiban, both taught by judges and concentrating on yoken-jijitsu-ron or what facts have 
to be alleged proven to make out claims), prosecutions (kensatsu, taught by prosecutors), 
civil and criminal law practice (minji and keiji bengo, taught by bengoshi). Trainees receive a 
government stipendium and subsidised accommodation, as well as externships in lawyers and 
prosecutors offices as well as a court. The rises in numbers of those passing the Examination 
each year over the last decade have been paralleled by reductions in the period of overall 
training at the LRTI, from 24 to 12 months. 
The style of LRTI instruction is very much based on court-related work, especially 
litigation techniques and judgment-writing. It retains remnants of the pre-War orientation 
towards training to become judges (or prosecutors, who were then considered equal or even 
superior to judges). This is despite the large proportion of judicial work involved in settling 
cases, rather than rendering formal judgments. It also goes against the reality that around 80 
per cent of LRTI graduates proceed into private legal practice, which is steadily involving 
more transactional legal work. Moreover, from the late 1960s some of the brightest graduates 
111）　See Part 10.
  ＊　For Australia, see James Douglas and Luke Nottage, ‘The Role of Practice in Legal Education: 
National Report for Australia’ (2010) 27 SCIL Working Paper at <http://sydney.edu.au/law/scil/
documents/2010/wp_no_27_Role_of_Practice_In_Legal_Ed.pdf> (accessed 9 August 2010). I also thank 
Associate Judge Yoshinori Hashiguchi, ANJeL Judge-in-Residence in Sydney over 2009-2010, for some 
of the data on Japan summarised here; but the views expressed here remain solely my own.
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began declining offers to work as judges upon graduation.112） Recently, Tokyo’s now very 
large law firms have become even more attractive career options.113）
Once graduates have decided on their career path, there is still very little lateral 
movement. The Courts Law has long provided that bengoshi or prosecutors can be appointed 
as judges, but there has been almost no exchange. One very limited exception has been the 
re-appointment as judges of prosecutors ‘loaned’ from the Courts to the Ministry of Justice, 
usually for 2-3 years.114） Another is the appointment of bengoshi as full-time judges, since 
the Supreme Court changed its policy due to increasing pressure from the JFBA. However, 
no more than five were appointed this way each year through the 1990s. Somewhat more 
have been so appointed following the JRC recommendations, but the numbers remain low 
— ranging between 4-10 yearly over 2003-9.115） A further recent development has been 
the appointment of bengoshi as part-time judicial officers (called chotei-kan) empowered to 
conduct civil or domestic relations conciliation procedures with the same level of competence 
as a judge. They are appointed from among attorneys who have practical experience of five 
or more years, and 237 were so appointed over 2004-9.
The few who are appointed to the judiciary from among bengoshi will have received 
some ongoing Continuing Legal Education, administered through Bar Associations, although 
this too is a recent and quite limited development. Those who pursue a career as a judge 
upon graduation from the LRTI are dependent on ongoing education administered by the 
Supreme Court. The Court itself organises various seminars or longer conferences (for 
example, two jitsumu kyogikai in 2009), usually to encourage — but not, at least formally, to 
force — more unified practices among lower courts dealing with pressing socio-legal issues 
(for example, traffic accidents from the 1960s). The LRTI also offers a few such conferences 
(collectively called sogo bunya kenkyukai: one of the two in 2009 was for judges seconded 
as professors to the new Law Schools). The LRTI offers more area-specific Seminars over 
two to three days (saiban bunya betsu kenkyukai: 19 in 2009), with numbers of attendees 
similarly capped at 20-40 judges each. Usually each lower court or Division within larger 
ones gets funding to send a judge to attend such events, meaning that judges — especially 
younger ones — do not get the opportunity to attend them very often. 
In addition, through the LRTI the Supreme Court arranges six induction courses (shokumu 
donyu kenshu) especially for newly appointed judges (for example, for one week immediately 
after graduation from the LRTI and before commencing work in the courts; four days after 
112）　See Yasuhei Taniguchi, ‘Reflections and a Personal Memoir’ in Harry Scheiber and Laurent Mayali 
(eds), Emerging Concepts of Rights in Japanese Law (Berkeley, UC Berkeley — Robbins Collection, 
2007), p 23.
113）　See Curtis Milhaupt and Mark West, Economic Organizations and Corporate Governance in Japan: 
The Impact of Formal and Informal Rules (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004).
114）　See Nottage, above n 28.
115）　See, in Japanese, ‘Saibankan ni Narimasen ka? [Would you like to be a judge?]’ <http://www.toben.
or.jp/news/libra/pdf/2009_11/p02-16.pdf> (accessed 3 August 2010).
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three years of judging; three days after 10 years and promotion from Associate to Full Judge; 
also three days for those few judges appointed from among bengoshi). There are also some 
separate induction courses and ongoing CLE Seminars specifically for Summary Court judges 
(five in 2009).
All such official judicial training is conducted internally; in general judges cannot 
get funding to attend conferences or educational events hosted by other organisations such 
as the JFBA. However, the Supreme Court does arrange for some short-term study tours 
(hakengata kenshu). In 2009 there were two to media organisations (newspaper companies 
and the national broadcaster NHK — for 16 full judges), three to private companies (Tokyo, 
Osaka, Nagoya — for 24 full judges), and two to a university or technology institute to get 
IP-related training (three judges, one for three months rather than two weeks). This program 
offers one-year secondments by full and especially associate judges to the Bank of Japan (one) 
and private companies (nine judges), with the Supreme Court covering their salaries and 
some further expenses. 
Lastly, the Court organises a growing number of other long-term secondments. One 
longstanding example is to the MoJ as shomu kenji (10 planned for 2010), where over two 
to three years the judges obtain new perspectives on legal practice and the workings of 
government by helping represent it in administrative and civil cases. Others go to the MoJ 
to assist with other work such as law reform initiatives over two to three years (10 in 2010). 
Another established practice is secondment directly to the Tokyo District Prosecutors Office 
for 2 years (a few judges, having at least five years’ experience). All these judges resign 
and get appointed as prosecutors (kenji), then get reappointed when rejoining the courts. 
So do almost all judges who are seconded to other Ministries or government agencies (a 
few each and also for two years in principle, although some of these also simultaneously 
have another status (for example, Tribunal Member or shinpankan if working in the Japan 
Fair Trade Commission). This includes the Foreign Ministry and its missions overseas, and 
usually another judge is seconded to JICA or the MoJ to assist them with legal technical 
assistance projects abroad. Around 30 associate judges do a year’s research based at courts 
or universities outside Japan (for example, in 2009: 9 out of 29 to Europe, 16 to the US, and 
two each to Australia and Canada). A few judges are usually seconded also to the House of 
Representatives’ or Cabinet’s Legal Affairs Division (hoseikyoku) or to the Social Insurance 
Agency (shakai yokin hoken kiko), and one to the Keidanren’s 21st Century Policy Institute 
think-tank. 
The gradual diversification of such secondments is also evident in placements now 
to private law firms (about 10 judges for 2010). They become registered as bengoshi for 
the two years, but also remain Court Officials (saibansho jimukan). Associate judges (and 
prosecutors) have been allowed this possibility since legislation was enacted in 2004 pursuant 
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to JRC recommendations.116） The aim, especially for these newer programs, is to broaden the 
judges’ horizons at an early career stage, and help them to be more adaptable and interactive 
— traits increasingly seen as valuable for judges in the post-JRC context of greater popular 
participation in the judicial system. And lastly, although no data is readily available, hundreds 
of judges now teach full-time or especially part-time in Japan’s new postgraduate Law 
Schools around the country.
13.  Arb-Med and New International Commercial Mediation Rules in Japan
(21 July 2009)
A recent issue of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association (JCAA) Newsletter is 
largely devoted to these topics.117） Sydney Law School and ANJeL are privileged to host 
not only one of Japan’s doyens in ICA (and other cross-border dispute resolution, especially 
WTO procedures), Professor Yasuhei Taniguchi (over July-August 2009).118） We also welcome 
(over September 2009-March 2010) Kokushikan University Professor Tatsuya Nakamura, a 
leader of Japan’s ‘new generation’ of arbitration specialists who heads JCAA’s Arbitration 
Department.
They have already got me thinking further about Arb-Med (arbitrators encouraging 
parties to settle their dispute), in the context also of interesting new JCAA Rules focused 
more specifically on Mediation.119） Both developments are important for Australia, presently 
reviewing its legislative and institutional framework for international commercial arbitration 
(ICA), as well as for many other Asia-Pacific countries intensely interested nowadays in 
efficient mechanisms to resolve cross-border disputes.120）
In the Newsletter, Professor Nakamura presents an intriguing preliminary study of Arb-
Med, which parties agreed to try in 48 (40 per cent) out of 121 JCAA arbitrations that 
proceeded over 1999-2008.121） About half (25 or 52 per cent) of these attempts resulted in 
a settlement agreement (with 18 then recorded as a ‘consent award’), and involved terms 
proposed by the arbitrator(s) (28 or 58 per cent). In most cases (37 or 77 per cent), the 
arbitrators attempted settlement after all evidence had been presented, suggesting that they 
116）　See, in Japanese, <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hourei/hanjiho.html> (accessed 1 April 2010).
117）　JCAA Newsletter (July 2009) No 22, available at <http://www.jcaa.or.jp/e/arbitration-e/syuppan-e/
newslet/newslist.html> (accessed 3 August 2010).
118）　See ANJeL, ‘ANJeL Visiting Academics Scheme’ <http://sydney.edu.au/law/anjel/content/anjel_people_
vis.html> (accessed 3 August 2010).
119）　Luke Nottage, ‘Arb-Med in Australia: The Time has Come’ (2007) 5 Australian ADR Reporter 
(Chartered Institute of Arbitrators — Australian Branch) 18, also available at <http://sydney.edu.au/law/
scigl/2007_docs_pdfs/ArbMed.pdf> (accessed 3 August 2010).
120）　Luke Nottage, ‘Australia’s Less Lethargic Law Reform? International Arbitration in the Asia-Pacific’ 
(19 April 2009) <http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/2009/04/australias_less_lethargic_law.html> 
(accessed 3 August 2010).
121）　JCAA Newsletter, above n 117, pp 10-12.
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adopted an ‘evaluative’ rather than ‘facilitative’ style to mediation. Attempts were particularly 
common among arbitrators with civil law rather than common law backgrounds, with the 
former almost being mostly Japanese. Professor Nakamura suggests that the background of 
the parties themselves did not seem so important, however, because in the 7 out of 48 cases (15 
per cent) where at least one party was from a common law background, those parties did not 
oppose the arbitrators’ attempt to settlement.
I do have some doubts first about that last generalisation, as the parties in those 7 cases 
may be unrepresentative. Specifically, we should examine the background of the 73 cases 
where Arb-Med was not even attempted. If there is a considerable number of cases where 
parties are from a common law background, it could be that arbitrators did not suggest Arb-
Med because they felt (rightly or wrongly) that they might be rebuffed. So we could infer 
that party background can be significant after all. 
Secondly, I would be interested to know more about the background of the parties’ 
legal advisors (especially outside counsel). For example, in the 7 cases where the parties 
didn’t oppose Arb-Med overtures, did the common law background parties engage civil law 
(especially Japanese) lawyers? I would expect English lawyers to be the most reticent about 
Arb-Med. Even more so than American lawyers, who not only have longer familiarity with 
ADR even in connection with court proceedings (since the 1980s), but also are trained in a 
less formalist variant of the common law (reflected also in less objection, for example, to the 
lex mercatoria122）).
Thirdly, have Arb-Med attempts have been increasing over this ten-year period? 
Professor Taniguchi, in private conversation, has a sense that instead they may have been 
decreasing. Indeed, Professor Nakamura himself downplayed the tendency for Arb-Med to 
occur in JCAA arbitrations when writing in an article published in 2001.123） This was partly 
in justifiable reaction to some continued critiques about various allegedly distinctive features 
of JCAA arbitrations (including by one of my former University of Sydney students124）). 
Leading Japanese arbitrators like Professor Taniguchi had also publically questioned whether 
Arb-Med was appropriate for international arbitrations in Japan, at least at this stage of its 
development, despite renewed advocacy for this hybrid procedure advanced by other leaders 
such as Professor Toshio Sawada.125） But there is growing evidence that costs — even more 
122）　See Luke Nottage, ‘Practical and Theoretical Implications of the Lex Mercatoria for Japan: Central’s 
Empirical Study on the Use of Transnational Law’ (2000) 4(2) Vindobona Journal of International 
Commercial Law and Arbitration 132, also available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=880388> (accessed 3 August 2010).
123）　Tatsuya Nakamura, ‘Continuing Mis-conceptions of International Commercial Arbitration in Japan’ 
(2001) 18(6) Journal of International Arbitration 641.
124）　Russell Thirgood, ‘A Critique of Foreign Arbitration in Japan’ (2001) 18(2) Journal of International 
Arbitration 177.
125）　See Luke Nottage, ‘Japan’s New Arbitration Law: Domestication Reinforcing Internationalisation?’ 
(2004) 7 International Arbitration Law Review 54, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=838025> (accessed 4 August 2010), with further references.
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so than delays, perhaps — are re-emerging as a major problem in ICA world-wide.126） And 
so the winds may be shifting in Japan too — towards more positive assessments and usage 
of measures like Arb-Med that promise greater efficiencies in cross-border dispute resolution. 
Fourthly, however, it would be helpful to know more about a key issue in current debates 
world-wide about Arb-Med: whether or how the arbitrators might meet separately which 
each party (‘caucusing’). As I have previously mentioned, experts from European civil law 
jurisdictions (let alone the Anglo-Australian variant of the common law tradition) generally 
remain skeptical about this, due to concerns about natural justice and (apparent or actual) 
bias tainting the arbitrators.127） By contrast, Professor Nakamura tells me that caucusing is 
very widely used in JCAA Arb-Med. (Similarly, this tends to occur in civil litigation before 
Japanese judges — unlike for example German judges, who actively encourage settlement but 
in open session.)
I don’t have so much problem with caucusing when combined with a more facilitative 
approach to mediation, for example, rephrasing and relaying one party’s argument to the other 
where parties have become too emotional or otherwise incapable of understanding what the 
other side is saying or proposing. I am also open to caucusing when, for instance, the parties 
have basically resolved major issues and only want Arb-Med to settle some remaining minor 
points. But I do have reservations when major issues and amounts are at stake. There can 
be a temptation for the arbitrator to indicate privately to one party that the other will settle 
within a particular range (even if the latter hasn’t really made that clear), and vice versa, in 
achieve a settlement. At least, a suspicion that this has occurred can arise, and it cannot easily 
be tested afterwards because of confidentiality obligations during the Arb-Med process. 
For such reasons and others, like CEDR I still prefer ‘no caucusing’ as the starting 
principle.128） And perhaps, if parties do get invited to caucus, they should be required to get 
separate professional legal (and practical) advice about such additional risks, as well as its 
possible benefits. They might then decide, for example, to allow caucusing but only in a 
more ‘facilitative’ style by the arbitrators, requiring the latter to try more ‘evaluative’ Arb-
Med (for example, proposing specific settlement terms or ranges) only in open session. 
Another possibility might be to allow one arbitrator to caucus in a more evaluative style, but 
retain a panel of three arbitrators to issue an award if settlement did not eventuate.
Interestingly, a commentary in the Newsletter by Mark Goodrich and Christopher 
Hunt regarding JCAA’s ‘New International Arbitration Commercial Mediation Rules’ quotes 
126）　Luke Nottage and Richard Garnett, ‘The Top Twenty Things to Change in or around Australia’s 
International Arbitration Act’ in Luke Nottage and Richard Garnett (eds), International Arbitration in 
Australia (Federation Press, Sydney, 2010), earlier version also available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1378722> (accessed 3 August 2010).
127）　See Part 14.
128）　CEDR is the Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution. See ‘The CEDR Commission on Settlement in 
International Arbitration’ <http://www.cedr.com/about_us/arbitration_commission/index.php> (accessed 3 
August 2010).
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Professor Nakamura as believing ‘that lawyers be ideal candidates to be evaluative mediators 
but that more focus should be placed on training facilitative mediators, as the skills required 
for that approach are more subtle’.129） On the other hand, they report that the first mediation 
under these Rules (in mid-March) involved an evaluative approach, with ‘the two days of 
the mediation meeting … filled by oral submissions and questions from the panel of three 
mediators’.130） This suggests that little or no caucusing took place, or at least that it could be 
a realistic option for parties to cross-border disputes even in ‘pure’ mediation settings.
In other words, these new Mediation Rules could be used either as a more facilitative 
manner, leaving subsequent arbitrations to allow the possibility of more evaluative Arb-
Med (with or even without caucusing). Or instead the new Rules could be used to have an 
evaluative-style mediation, possibly not even involving caucusing — although Rule 9.5 creates 
a default rule allowing it (subject to any contrary party agreement, however, as mediation 
naturally is rooted in consent).
Either way, however, it is important to note that Rule 8 allows a mediator subsequently 
to sit as an arbitrator simply ‘if the parties so agree’. Goodrich and Hunt argue that this 
differs from mediation rules for the ICC and SCC (Stockholm Chamber of Commerce), 
‘where the starting assumption is that this should not happen’.131） They also contrast HKIAC 
Mediation Rule 14, prohibiting the mediator from later becoming the arbitrator even if parties 
so agree. (Presumably, if parties wish this they should instead commence arbitration, then 
allow Arb-Med but subject to the provisions of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance — 
although in practice those Arb-Med provisions apparently are hardly ever used.) 
I would also add that JCAA Mediation Rule 8 seems to allow even oral agreement. But 
if Japan’s Arbitration Act 2003 applies then agreement triggering the subsequent arbitration 
does have to be in writing (Japan has not adopted the revised UNCITRAL ICA Model Law 
variant that permits purely oral agreements132）) and arbitrator selection is anyway usually 
done by writing. By contrast, if the arbitration commences first, the Act requires any Arb-
Med to be recorded in writing (unless — perhaps even orally! — the parties dispense with 
that writing requirement).
An even more important feature rightly highlighted by Goodrich and Hunt is JCAA 
Mediation Rule 11: if parties agree to settle, they can appoint the mediator as arbitrator 
to issue a consent award. They question whether the 1958 New York Convention regime 
will enforce ‘the somewhat artificial “award” as in this case’.133） However, they note that 
SCC Mediation Rule 11 has a similar provision. But I would point out that the latter’s 
effectiveness has been criticised too.134） For this reason too, it may be better to begin with 
129）　JCAA Newsletter, above n 117, p 10.
130）　Ibid, p 7.
131）　Ibid, p 8.
132）　See ‘UNCITRAL’ <http://www.uncitral.org> (accessed 3 August 2010).
133）　JCAA Newsletter, above n 117, p 8.
134）　Christopher Newmark and Richard Hill, ‘Can A Mediated Settlement Become An Enforceable ↗
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an arbitration, then allow (in writing) Arb-Med under specified conditions (such as ‘no 
caucusing’). Indeed, parties could require the arbitrator to attempt settlement well before the 
evidentiary phase. This would also maximise the potential for time and cost savings, a major 
attraction of the new JCAA Mediation Rules.
That alternative would also avoid a third interesting feature: Rule 7.3 requires the 
mediator to ‘be independent in principle’ but remain always ‘impartial’ (although Rules 7.4 
and 7.7 refer to ‘independence or impartiality’ in connection with the mediator’s disclosure 
requirements). By contrast, JCAA Arbitration Rule 28.1 demands both independence and 
impartiality of arbitrators. (Further, Article 5.4 of the 2002 UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Conciliation encourages appointment of mediators who are both 
independent and impartial.135）)
A final caveat highlighted by Goodrich and Hunt is that the confidentiality obligation in 
Mediation Rule 12.3 does not expressly cover all information disclosed in the mediation, and 
so may not extend to all documents produced during those proceedings.136） I would contrast 
Arbitration Rule 40.2, which refers to all ‘facts’ relating to the arbitration). That formulation 
could be another reason to chose arbitration but with additional consent to Arb-Med (pursuant 
to Arbitration Rule 47, and as allowed by Article 38.4 of the Japanese Act).
However, the alternative is to use the new JCAA Mediation Rules, trying to circumvent 
these issues as much as possible through further party agreement varying relevant rules 
or clarifying more precisely what is expected (and allowed) regarding the mediator. The 
Rules will also be useful for other arbitral institutions interested in updating their own 
rules on international mediation. For example, ACICA has an official ‘panel of mediators’ 
— albeit currently with only one person listed137） — but its mediation rules are still based 
quite closely on the 1980 UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules. JCAA’s new Rules are also 
very welcome, especially when considered alongside the innovative study on Arb-Med by 
Professor Nakamura, for the growing number of other dispute resolution organisations and 
experts world-wide interested in developing best practice for arbitrators facilitating settlement.
14. International Investment and Commercial Arbitration in Australia and 
Japan: Shared Challenges, Different Solutions?＊
(20 July 2009)
Australia and Japan face a remarkably similar challenge. Few international arbitrations have 
↘ Arbitration Award?’ (2000) 16 Arbitration International 81.
135）　The Model Law is accessible via UNCITRAL, above n 132.
136）　JCAA Newsletter, above n 117, p 8.
137）　See <http://www.acica.org.au/panel_mediators.html> (accessed 21 July 2009).
  ＊　This is an outline of my presentation at the International Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration 
conference held at Sydney Law School over 19-20 February 2010: see <http://sydney.edu.au/news/
law/457.html?eventcategoryid=37&eventid=430> (accessed 4 August 2010).
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their seat in either country, despite various initiatives undertaken over the last decade or 
two.138） Both Australia and Japan probably need to adapt quite radical measures to overcome 
remaining barriers to attracting international arbitration activity to their respective shores. 
This shared problem is serious not just because their arbitrators, lawyers, institutions or local 
economies miss out on business — after all, at least the arbitrators and lawyers can still 
earn fees by deploying their skills in arbitrations further abroad. The problem is serious also 
because low levels of international arbitration activity in both countries limit the potential to 
develop domestic arbitration, ADR more generally, and indeed effective civil procedure.
Despite the shared challenge, however, quite radical solutions for each country may 
differ somewhat. Expedited arbitration procedures may be a particular selling point for 
Australia, but not Japan. Caucusing in Arb-Med may work in Japan, but not Australia. And 
Japan may have more scope than Australia to develop international arbitration through a 
‘whole-of-government’ approach that promotes investment arbitration provisions, for example, 
even in treaties with other developed countries.
Few international arbitrations in either country persist despite, firstly, striking differences 
in background ‘general culture’ (predominantly British/Irish in Australia, plus diverse 
immigrant groups particularly since the 1970s139）); and, arguably more importantly, in ‘legal 
culture’ (the strict English variant of the common law in Australia; a considerable Franco-
German civil law legacy in Japan). This makes it harder to advance a straightforward 
‘culturalist’ (or ‘Asian Values’) explanation for low levels of arbitration activity.140） That 
becomes even more questionable in light of empirical evidence that Japanese corporations 
quite frequently appear before arbitral institutions (and even national courts) outside Japan, 
and regularly include arbitration clauses in their cross-border contracts.141） More anecdotal 
evidence suggests the same for Australian corporations. They often use arbitration too, but the 
seat still tends to be located abroad — albeit perhaps increasingly in other parts of the Asia-
Pacific, not just held in the traditional European or US ‘core’ of the arbitration world.
There are also problems with a second explanation sometimes given for low levels 
of arbitration and litigation activity within Japan, and potentially elsewhere — including 
therefore Australia. An ‘economic rationalist’ paradigm focuses instead on predictability of 
substantive law (and, by extension, procedural law). If the outcomes (and processes) are 
reasonably certain, parties will not persist with the formal proceeding. Instead, they will 
negotiate out or mediate the dispute, thus jointly saving the costs involved. This theory 
may help explain why the US, in particular, has quite a lot of domestic arbitration activity 
138）　Nottage, above n 125.
139）　Luke Nottage, ‘Multicultural Japan? Policy, Law and Society’ (26 June 2009) <http://blogs.usyd.edu.
au/japaneselaw/2009/06/multicultural_japan_policy_law.html> (accessed 4 August 2010).
140）　Abe and Nottage, above n 93.
141）　Toshimitsu Kitagawa and Luke Nottage, ‘Globalization of Japanese Corporations and the Development 
of Corporate Legal Departments: Problems and Prospects’ (2006) Sydney Law School Research Paper 
No 06/46 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=837906> (accessed 4 August 2010).
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— parties wish to avoid the uncertainties of jury trials and so on even in civil trials. But 
it doesn’t explain why Japan has low levels of domestic arbitration, despite more much 
more predictable court processes. The theory becomes even more intractable when extended 
to international arbitrations, in an attempt to explain few cases with their seat in Japan or 
Australia.
This leaves a third explanation, also derived originally from literature comparing civil 
litigation rates. ‘Institutional barriers’ dissuade parties from choosing Japan or Australia as 
the seat for their arbitrations.142） For example, court costs and legal fees in Japan are quite 
reasonable; unlike judges, arbitrators are not subsidised by the state. Initially it was uncertain 
whether even ‘foreign law solicitors’ resident in Japan could represent clients in international 
arbitrations. There were also concerns about the skills of bengoshi lawyers and of Japanese 
arbitrators in international arbitration. And Japan’s arbitration legislation dated back to 1898.
Yet the legislature clarified the foreign lawyers issue in 1996, and in 2003 enacted an 
Arbitration Act based on the UNCITRAL Model Law (admittedly, in the context of broader 
reforms that simultaneously made civil litigation more attractive as well).143） Australia resolved 
both issues in 1989, although its International Arbitration Act was reviewed from late 2008 
and court decisions have been less pro-arbitration than those of Japanese courts (especially 
when enforcing foreign arbitral awards).144） Both Australia and now Japan also have an 
emerging ‘new generation’ of arbitration law experts — lawyers, arbitrators and professors.
Do these recent parallels therefore suggest that international arbitrations will increase 
significantly in both countries? This paper suggests that this is unlikely, unless some fairly 
radical measures are taken. One reason is that a major barrier remains fairly insurmountable: 
geography. Why come all the way down to Australia or across to Japan, especially given their 
limited caseloads so far? Especially now that more convenient venues like Hong Kong and 
Singapore have attracted much larger caseloads and experience since the 1990s, also boasting 
quite similar attractions (Model Law based legislation, experts, independent and professional 
courts supportive of arbitration). All the more so, now that countries like Korea are also 
devoting significant resources in an attempt to share in some of their success. 
A second reason is that the governments in neither Japan nor Australia appear prepared 
to devote so much time or resources to compete for business in the Asia-Pacific. If they 
were, we would have expected a much earlier and ambitious set of reforms to international 
(and domestic) arbitration in Australia. We would also have expected a more flexible 
approach to have emerged regarding investment treaty arbitration, which has significant 
synergies with commercial arbitration despite the greater public interests involved.145） At 
142）　See generally Abe and Nottage, above n 93.
143）　Nottage, above n 125.
144）　Nottage and Garnett, above n 126.
145）　Luke Nottage and Kate Miles, ‘ “Back to the Future” for Investor-State Arbitrations: Revising Rules 
in Australia and Japan to Meet Public Interests’ (2009) 26(1) Journal of International Arbitration 25, 
updated in Luke Nottage and Richard Garnett (eds) International Arbitration in Australia (Federation ↗
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present, in negotiating BITs and FTAs, it seems that Australia maintains a simplistic position: 
‘no investment arbitration provisions with developed countries’.
Japan adopts a more nuanced position in this last respect (for example, including such 
provisions in its FTA with Switzerland recently), although perhaps because it is often a 
net capital exporter even vis-à-vis other developed countries. Promoting investment treaty 
arbitration provisions and reforms may therefore be one way that Japan can develop a 
somewhat higher profile in international arbitration more generally.146）
But another and more direct way is to take develop a feature of JCAA (and presumably 
TOMAC) arbitration: a tradition of arbitrators encouraging settlement during the proceedings, 
especially — according to a recent study by ANJeL Research Visitor Professor Tatsuya 
Nakamura — if they come from a civil law or Japanese background.147） However, it seems 
that almost all such attempts include ‘caucusing’ (arbitrators meeting separately with parties). 
This is unusual even for civil law arbitrators, at least from the Germanic tradition, and is 
not recommended in recent international initiatives from the likes of CEDR.148） So Japan can 
either revise its practice, or try to turn this ‘caucusing’ feature into a distinctive marketing 
advantage. The CIArb in Australia is currently developing Arb-Med rules that do allow for 
caucusing, but ACICA’s Rules Subcommittee prefers the CEDR approach. Even the latter 
version of ‘Arb-Med’ will represent quite a radical measure to try to increase Australia’s 
attractiveness vis-à-vis countries like Singapore and Hong Kong (which do not actively 
engage in Arb-Med, in fact, despite provisions in their Acts).
A final and quite radical way forward for Australia is to promote Expedited Arbitration. 
By insisting that an oral hearing is used only exceptionally (Rule 13.2149）), and even then 
potentially using internet-based videoconferencing, it can overcome the tyranny of distance. 
By keeping costs down more generally, Australia can distinguish itself from other venues 
around the Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, Japan may have a comparative advantage 
in regular proceedings, especially larger-scale and more complex arbitrations. After all, 
to venture a cross-cultural over-generalisation: the Japanese pride themselves on being 
meticulous, whereas the Australian ethos is to get the job done quickly — even if this means 
cutting some corners or not getting it quite right.
↘ Press, Sydney, 2010), Chapter 10.
146）　Luke Nottage and Romesh Weeramantry, ‘Investment Arbitration for Japan and Asia: Five Perspectives 
on Law and Practice’ (March 2009) Sydney Centre Working Paper No 21 <http://sydney.edu.au/law/scil/
documents/2009/SCILWP21_NottageWeeramantry.pdf> (accessed 4 August 2010).
147）　See JCAA Newsletter, above n 117.
148）　See CEDR, above n 128.
149）　Accessible via ACICA’s website at <http://www.acica.org.au/> (accessed 4 August 2010).
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15. International Commercial Arbitration Reform in Australia, Japan and Beyond
(12 July 2010)
Australia’s long-awaited International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) received Royal 
Assent on 6 July, after the Senate agreed on 17 June to the Bill introduced to the House 
of Representatives on 25 November 2009 as revised by the federal Government itself on 
17 March 2010.150） The International Arbitration Act 1974, as thereby amended (‘amended 
IAA’), is set in broader context by the first book devoted to this important field of dispute 
resolution (‘DR’) law and practice.151）
This eleven-chapter work adds a Preface from NSW Chief Justice Spigelman, a powerful 
proponent of arbitration and broader access to justice as well as judicial exchange with 
Japan.152） It is partly dedicated to Professor Yasuhei Taniguchi, one of my inspiring former 
teachers at Kyoto University in the early 1990s and a Distinguished Visitor to Sydney Law 
School over July-August 2009.153） He is also renowned as a practitioner of international 
commercial arbitration (ICA), having served for example as arbitrator in an ICC arbitration in 
Melbourne, as well as a former Judge on the WTO Appellate Body. 
The amended IAA brings new promise for ICA in Australia, and may offer lessons for 
countries like Japan. But Australia can also learn from Japan, especially the thorough way in 
which it goes about legislative reform.
Australia’s IAA was first amended in 1989 by adopting the 1985 UNCITRAL Model 
Law on ICA (ML), which also forms the core of Japan’s Arbitration Act of 2003.154） This 
ML regime was important in diminishing scope for court intervention in arbitration once 
agreed by the parties, thus promising greater potential for them to tailor the arbitral process 
to their particular DR needs. Australia’s amended IAA of 2010 goes a step further by largely 
adopting the 2006 revisions to the Model Law agreed by this United Nations Commission, 
which includes Australia and Japan as permanent members. These revisions further expand 
party autonomy, but Japan has yet to follow Australia — and earlier already Florida and 
150）　See Richard Garnett and Luke Nottage, “The 2010 Amendments to the International Arbitration Act: 
A New Dawn for Australia? (2011) 7 (1) Asian International Arbitration Journal forthcoming.
151）　Luke Nottage and Richard Garnett (eds), International Arbitration in Australia (Federation Press, 
Sydney, 2010). See publication details at <http://www.federationpress.com.au/bookstore/book.
asp?isbn=9781862878051> and the draft Prelims downloadable at <http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/
prelims_WS14clean.pdf> (both accessed 4 August 2010). The International Arbitration Act is available 
online at Comlaw <http://www.comlaw.gov.au> (accessed 4 August 2010). 
152）　The Honourable JJ Spigelman AC, ‘Judicial Exchange between Australia and Japan (28 February 
2006) <http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO_spigelman280206> 
(accessed 4 August 2010).
153）　See Luke Nottage, ‘Taniguchi Talk: Does the WTO Really Settle International Trade Disputes?’ (1 
August 2009) <http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/2009/08/taniguchi_talk.html> (accessed 4 August 2010).
154）　Arbitration Law (No 138 of 2003), English translation available at <http://www.jcaa.or.jp/e/arbitration/
civil.html> (accessed 4 August 2010).
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Ireland (with enactments in 2010), Hong Kong (with a Bill proposed in 2009), Mauritius, 
Peru, Rwanda and Slovenia (enactments in 2008), as well as New Zealand (2007).
The amended IAA, even more so than the 1989 amendments and Japan’s 2003 
legislation, also adds many extra useful features to the ML core provisions. For example, it 
sets out detailed provisions on arbitration confidentiality and privacy (ss 23C – 23G), which 
apply if parties expressly ‘opt in’ to them. These draw on the New Zealand legislation, 
although that applies instead on an ‘opt out’ basis (that is, unless parties agree otherwise). 
Japan’s Act, like the ML, contain no provisions — and therefore guidance for parties, legal 
advisors and courts — regarding this topic, although confidentiality appears to be particularly 
valued in the Asian region by arbitration users and practitioners.155） 
The amended IAA also now forms the core of Australia’s regime for domestic 
commercial arbitration disputes. In June, based on prior agreement among the states and 
territories to follow its lead, NSW enacted the Commercial Arbitration Act 2010 (CAA), 
modelled also on ML provisions. The new uniform CAAs include extra provisions not 
found in the more directly ML-inspired IAA, such as review of awards for certain serious 
substantive errors of law by the arbitrators, which derive from older English legislation and 
are considered a more appropriate starting point for domestic rather than international DR. 
However, the CAA still allows parties to opt in to the IAA regime, and thus avoid this extra 
possibility of supervision by local courts, if that suits their needs for greater finality and 
speed. (Japan’s 2003 Act also basically has the same regime for international and domestic 
arbitrations, but, for example, excludes labour arbitrations and allows consumers to terminate 
an arbitration agreement.)
Lastly, the amended IAA offers a platform for a real ‘cultural reform’ in Australia, as 
the federal Attorney-General urged at a conference on 4 December 2009:156） 
If Australia is to ever emerge as an arbitration centre we need our arbitrators to provide 
a service that is not available in those seats —  something that is more than ‘litigation-
lite’. We need to invent a form of arbitration that is tailored to the needs of the parties 
— to the needs of business. A form of arbitration that is prepared to do away with 
unnecessary formalities and get on with identifying and solving the problem that exists 
between the parties. A form of arbitration that delivers swift and cost-competitive 
outcomes. A form of arbitration that is innovative and creative and allows the undoubted 
talents that exist in the arbitration community to flourish. We need to be able to put 
155）　Shahla F Ali, ‘Approaching the Global Arbitration Table: Comparing the Advantages of Arbitration as 
Seen by Practitioners in East Asia and the West’ (2009) 28(4) Review of Litigation 791 <http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1542609> (accessed 4 August 2010).
156）　Robert McClelland, ‘International Commercial Arbitration in Australia: More Effective and Certain’ (4 
December 2009) <http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/www/ministers/mcclelland.nsf/Page/Speeches_2009_
FourthQuarter_4December2009-InternationalCommercialArbitrationinAustraliaMoreEffectiveandCertain> 
(accessed 4 August 2010).
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ourselves forward as the place you come to when you want your problem fixed, and 
fixed fast and fairly.
However, the amended IAA may not be enough for this or to lead to a significant 
increase in ICA cases based in Australia, as opposed to the traditional ‘core’ venues (Paris, 
Geneva, New York and London) and now well-established Asian venues (Beijing, Hong Kong 
and Singapore).157） In this sense of persistently low caseloads despite legislative activity and 
the ongoing growth in ICA filings world-wide, albeit arguably for partly different reasons, 
Australia and Japan share a common experience.158） This may not be much of an upswing 
despite financial commitments in May 2010 by the NSW and federal governments, along 
with Australian arbitral institutions, to establish the dedicated new ‘Australian International 
Disputes Centre’ in Sydney.159） 
This more pessimistic prognosis arises first because party autonomy is not consistently 
promoted in the amended IAA. For example, no ‘opt out’ is permitted. Not just into the CAA 
regime, which Courts in Queensland had allowed too readily. No opt out is permitted now 
into a foreign arbitral law, to govern their dispute, even though this would not usually be 
advisable anyway. New Zealand, and other countries inspired by its original Arbitration Act 
and earlier Law Commission report (such as Singapore and Malaysia), allows such opt-outs. 
Influential commentators in Japan, including Professor Taniguchi, argue that the 2003 Act’s 
silence on this issue allows scope for parties to exercise their free choice. Indeed, he suggests 
that opting out of the Act into a regime that allows review for serious error of substantive 
law, at least for domestic disputes, might even promote arbitration in Japan.
More importantly, it is unclear which provisions in Australia’s amended IAA are 
mandatory, that is, incapable of any derogation by the parties. This extends even to ‘opt in’ 
provisions such as those now related to confidentiality. Arguably there are some provisions (for 
example, the scope of persons who can be bound by confidentiality obligations) which can be 
varied by party agreement. But there may well be others that instead are mandatory, such as 
the statutory ‘public interest’ exemptions.
Also debatable is the Government’s assertion, in its Supplementary Explanatory 
Memorandum for its March 2010 amendments to the original Bill, that various optional 
provisions were changed (especially from ‘opt in’ to ‘opt out’) in order to align the amended 
IAA more closely with legislation in the UK, Singapore and Hong Kong.160） For example, 
both confidentiality and consolidation of related disputes are instead ‘opt-out’ provisions in 
the English Arbitration Act 1996. And indeed failure to assist the arbitrators in specified ways 
157）　Comparative data available at <http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/Ch01_Introduction_Appendix.pdf> 
(accessed 4 August 2010), Luke Nottage and Richard Garnett © 2010.
158）　See Part 14.
159）　See website of the Australian International Disputes Centre, at <http://www.disputescentre.com.au> 
(accessed 4 December 2010).
160）　The original Bill is available via <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au> (accessed 4 August 2010).
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is a mandatory provision in that Act, not ‘opt-out’ as under s 23A of the amended IIA.
The Australian Government also did not adopt several recommendations made in a public 
Submission by myself and Professor Garnett to the IAA Review initiated in November 2008. 
The following were some of our ‘Top 20’ recommendations, developed into an article in the 
Asian International Arbitration Journal (and now Chapter 8 of our new book), which promised 
even greater potential for more cost- and time-efficient arbitral procedures for Australia:161） 
-  There is no additional clarification about what matters are ‘arbitrable’ for the purposes 
of enforcing agreements or awards, or running arbitrations with the seat in Australia, as 
opposed to being contrary to other mandatory laws such as trade practices legislation; 
-  The writing requirements for valid arbitration agreements have been liberalised, but not 
completely (even for arbitrations where the seat is in Australia);
-  There is no clarification allowing Australian courts to enforce awards that have been 
annulled in foreign seats;
-  There is no provision for arbitrators to issue (even non-binding) ex parte ‘preliminary 
orders’ in support of interim measure of protection, as in almost all other countries that 
have adopted the 2006 revisions to the ML, and seemingly it is impossible for parties 
to agree otherwise on this point;
-  There is no reference to international ‘soft law’ instruments such as the Rules on the 
Taking of Evidence in ICA agreed in 1999 (and amended in 2010) by the International 
Bar Association (IBA) or the ILA’s 2002 Recommendations regarding ‘public policy’ 
as one of the limited grounds for refusing enforcement of a foreign award;
-  There are no provisions on Arb-Med (arbitrators actively encouraging settlement).162） 
These deficiencies in substantive outcomes are also related, in my view, to a rather 
inadequate consultation process. In particular, the Government should have referred its Bill 
to a specialist parliamentary committee for a proper round of public inquiry, as, for example, 
in its recent amendment to trade practices and consumer law.163） Japan now has an admirably 
transparent process of shingikai law reform deliberation, partly thanks to the internet, and the 
strong influence still of academic experts helps produce impressive outcomes.
Despite these problems in process and outcome, the amended IAA may still result 
in some significant ‘cultural reform’ for Australia. One overlooked factor is to take full 
advantage of the expertise of professors expert in arbitration law (and, preferably, other 
related fields such as private international law, contract and commercial law). It is worth 
161）　See Nottage and Garnett, above n 151.
162）　On Arb-Med, see Part 13 above.
163）　Luke Nottage, ‘Senate Inquiry into Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill (No 
2) 2010’ (23 April 2010) <http://acren.wordpress.com/2010/04/23/senate-inquiry-into-trade-practices-
amendment-australian-consumer-law-bill-no-2-2010/> (accessed 4 August 2010).
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remembering that ICA grew almost out of nothing in the 1950s and 1960s thanks especially 
to an older generation of academics, such as Professor Taniguchi. Some of the leading 
arbitrators in Europe and North American are still professors, and the professoriate is also 
very prominent in the still relatively new burgeoning field of investor-state arbitrations (usually 
now pursuant to investment treaties or FTAs).164） Full-time professors can bring not only a 
comprehensive understanding of the field(s) of law, but also a willingness to resolve disputes 
quickly and therefore cost-effectively so they can return to their ‘day jobs’, which are still 
not dominated by the ‘billable hours’ mentality increasingly prevalent in legal practice.165） 
In this respect more generally, it is somewhat disturbing to find over the last two 
decades that there is declining proportion of professors invited to present at the major 
biannual Congresses for ICA run by a leading association, the International Council for 
Commercial Arbitration:166）
Hopefully, in Australia especially, both arbitral institutions and policy makers will draw on 
and support a new and diverse generation of arbitration specialists in order to achieve real 
‘cultural reform’ for ICA.
164）　See Nottage and Miles, above n 145.
165）　See The Honourable Wayne Martin, ‘Billable hours — past their use-by date?’ (17 May 2010) <http://
www.lawsocietywa.asn.au/AnnouncementRetrieve.aspx?ID=32465> (accessed 4 August 2010).
166）　For information on conferences and congresses, see ICCA’s website, at <http://www.arbitration-icca.
org/conferences-and-congresses.html> (accessed 4 August 2010). Source data can be found at <http://
blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/SpeakersICCAconfs.pdf> (accessed 4 August 2010).

